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A PRISONER'S RIGHT OF ACCESS TO THE COURTS
The United States District Court for the Middle
District of Georgia recently took the opportunity
to extend the Supreme Court's decision in Bounds
v. Smith,' and held, in Gibson v. Jackson,2 that an
indigent prisoner sentenced to die is entitled to a
state financed attorney to assist in his state habeas
corpus petition. In Bounds the Supreme Court ruled
that individual states are under an affirmative duty
to protect a prisoner's fundamental constitutional
right of access to the courts. Specifically, the Court
held that the states must provide this meaningful
access by maintaining adequate law libraries or by
providing adequate assistance from persons trained
in the law.3 In Gibson the district court engaged in
a particularized factual analysis and determined
that the proposed law library system in Georgia
would not be sufficient to assure petitioner Gibson
meaningful access to the courts. To insure his
meaningful access, the court ordered that the state
habeas court appoint, at its own expense, an attor-
ney for Gibson, and that the state pay for investi-
gative witnesses and litigation expenses which
would be reasonably necessary for the case to be
fully and fairly aired in the state court.
In Bounds v. Smith,4 several prison inmates in
North Carolina brought suit under 42 U.S.C. §
1983,5 alleging that their fourteenth amendment
rights had been violated. The inmates claimed that
their right of access to the courts, a constitutional
right which had been upheld earlier by the Court
430 U.S. 817 (1977).
2 No. 77-59-Mac (M.D. Ga., Dec. 16, 1977).
3 430 U.S. at 828.
4430 U.S. 817 (1977).
5 42 U.S.C. § 1983 states:
Civil action for deprivation of rights. Every person who,
under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or im-
munities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
in Younger v. Gilmore," had been denied by the state
of North Carolina because the state had not pro-
vided adequate research facilities with which to
prepare court petition papers.
The Court considered at length whether a con-
stitutionally based right of access to the courts
existed. Not only did it affirm that such a right
exists, but the Court went further to assert that the
states have an affirmative duty to insure that such
access is reasonable and adequate. The Court em-
phasized that "'meaningful access' to the courts is
the touchstone ' 7 to assuring that indigent defend-
ants have an adequate opportunity to present their
claims fairly. Furthermore, the Court directed
North Carolina to shoulder the expense of provid-
ing such access for their prisoners. The cost to the
state was of minor importance to the Court. As the
Court noted:
[Tihe cost of protecting a constitutional right cannot
justify its total denial. Thus, neither the availability
ofjailhouse lawyers nor the necessity for affirmative
state action is dispositive of respondents' claims.
The inquiry is rather whether law libraries or other
forms of legal assistance are needed to give prisoners
a reasonably adequate opportunity to present
claimed violations of fundamental constitutional
rights to the courts.
8
The Court considered the merits of various alter-
natives which conceivably could be utilized by
North Carolina to satisfy the requirements of rea-
sonable access,9 found that Ross v. Moffittt ° sup-
640)4 U.S. 15 (1971). The Court, per curiam, affirmed
the decision of the District Court for the Northern District
of California on the authority of Johnson v. Avery, 393
U.S. 483 (1969). The district court suggested numerous
alternatives available to the state, including providing a
public defender assistance program, an adequate law
library, or a joint law student-law professor program.
Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105, 110-11 (N.D. Cal.
1970).
7 430 U.S. at 823.
8 Id. at 825.
9 Id. at 826-27, 830-32.
15417 U.S. 600 (1974). The Ross Court held that a
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ported its conclusions," and held that North Car-
olina must "assist inmates in the preparation and
filing of meaningful legal papers by providing
prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate
assistance from persons trained in the law."'
2
"Meaningful access" was the Court's touchstone.'
3
On May 12, 1975, Samuel Gibson III was tried
for the rape and murder of Joan D. Bryan, was
con'icted by a jury, and was sentenced to die
pursuant to the Georgia death penalty statute.'
4
That decision was eventually upheld in an appeal
of right to the Supreme Court of Georgia in Gibson
v. State.' 5 Gibson then petitioned the Butts County
Superior Court for a writ of habeas corpus pur-
suant to Georgia Code Ann. § 50-127, and re-
quested the appointment of counsel at the state's
expense. The state refused. As a result, Gibson
petitioned the United States District Court, prior
to being heard in the state court, urging the district
court to find, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,16 that
the state of Georgia was denying him his constitu-
tional right of access to the courts by refusing to
finance a lawyer's services for his state habeas
proceeding.
The Gibson court relied extensively on the Bounds
decision and engaged in its own particularized
inquiry to determine what would be needed to
provide Gibson with a reasonably adequate oppor-
tunity to fairly present his claims in court. The
court necessarily tailored its analysis and decision
to the arguments which Gibson was attempting to
present to the state habeas court because only by
inspecting the complexity of his state claims could
the court determine whether Gibson would be
capable of handling the claims without an attor-
ney. Volunteer counsel in the United States District
Court proceeding identified for the court five issues
which conceivably could be brought up in the state
proceeding.17 The complex factual and legal issues,
prisoner's right to an opportunity to present his claims
fairly did not require appointment of counsel to file
petitions for discretionary review in state courts or in the
Supreme Court. The Bounds Court distinguished the Ross
decision on the grounds that "we are concerned in large
part with original actions seeking new trials, release from
confinement, or vindication of fundamental civil rights."
430 U.S. at 827.
" 430 U.S. at 827.
12 Id. at 828.
'3 Id. at 823.
14 GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1 (1975).
's 236 Ga. 874, 226 S.E.2d 63 (1976).
16 For full text, see note 5 supra.
,7 Petitioner's initial claim is of ineffective assistance
by appointed trial counsel.
Second is petitioner's claim that the grand and petit
combined with the technical nature of Georgia's
habeas corpus statute, which is even "difficult for
judges and lawyers to apply,' 8 and the fact that
a capital offense was involved, amounted to cir-
cumstances which required the additional affirm-
ative step of furnishing an attorney for indigent
Gibson in his state habeas proceeding. As the court
noted:
Petitioner's case and its issues as presently known
and already described, is far from routine. It is
complex from both a legal and factual standpoint.
If the hearing on the merits that the habeas statute
provides for is to be truly adverserial in nature, both
sides of each legal and factual issue must be pre-
sented to the trial judge.... This is not to say that
every prisoner who petitions for a writ of habeas
corpus is entitled to counsel and such expenses of
litigation. It is to say that this petitioner whose need
for counsel and such expenses has been demon-
strated, and others similarly situated are constitu-
tionally entitled to counsel and such expenses. With-
out them petitioner's access to the courts of this
state for a habeas hearing is and will be meaningless
instead of meaningful as the Constitution requires. 19
The district court specifically found that the hold-
ing in Bounds established only a minimum standard
jury master lists from which his grand and petit juries
were selected were unconstitutionally composed.
Third is petitioner's assertion that his death sentence
violates the constitutional standards set forth in Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). In Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153 (1976), where the Court upheld the use of the
death penalty so long as certain procedural safeguards
are utilized, the Court found that there must be statutory
aggravating circumstances tojustify the imposition of the
death penalty. Mr. Gibson contends that since the alleged
sexual acts on the victim took place after her death, there
was no rape. Therefore, because there was not the aggra-
vating circumstance of rape which accompanied the mur-
der, the death sentence was improperly applied.
Fourth is counsel's assertion that since the trial lasted
until several hours after midnight, petitioner Gibson's
Fifth Amendment right of due process was violated.
Fifth is counsel's assertion that Owens v. State, 120
Ga. 296, 48 S.E. 21, and Futch v. State, 90 Ga. 472, 16
S.E. 102, require that petitioner's entire admission of
guilt be believed with respect to every particular fact
because the crimes petitioner was convicted of cannot be
proven without such admissions.
Gibson v. Jackson, No. 77-59-Mac, slip op. at 8-12 (M.D.
Ga. Dec. 16, 1977).
18 Gibson v. Jackson, No. 77-59-Mac, slip op. at 2
(M.D. Ga. Dec. 16, 1977). The fact that major amend-
ments to the state habeas provision were to be effective
April 24, 1975 (two weeks following the act in question,
three weeks prior to trial) was possibly an overriding
concern for the district court.
'
9 Id. at 16, 17.
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for the various states. Furthermore, the court
pointed out that the Bounds Court noted that "any
plan ... must be evaluated as a whole to ascertain
its compliance with constitutional standards." 2 As
such, it found that Gibson's case of "dire conse-
quences" required additional affirmative action to
protect his constitutional right of access.
While the Gibson opinion is in line with the spirit
of Bounds v. Smith, it appears that the weakest link
in that opinion lies in the very area of access rights
to the courts. This right is basically one of access to
federal courts.2 Under the Bounds decision, Georgia
is under an affirmative duty to assist Gibson's
access to the federal courts, at least by providing
adequate libraries or other legal assistance. How-
ever, because the federal habeas statute requires a
prisoner to exhaust his state habeas remedies prior
to petitioning the federal courts,*2 and Gibson is
still involved in his state habeas proceeding, Geor-
gia is arguably not yet under an affirmative duty,
as per Bounds, to assist Gibson in his state petition.
Certainly it can be stated that Georgia is not
actively inhibiting Gibson's access to the federal
courts. Indeed, Gibson theoretically need only rou-
tinely approach the courts in Georgia to gain a
right to petition the federal district court. The
district court, however, apparently felt it important
that Gibson was doing just that, stating that he
was "jo]bviously aiming to eventually try to peti-
tion [the district court] ' ' 3 by exhausting his state
remedies. Furthermore, the court emphasized at
length that under the federal habeas statute, all
state factual determinations are statutorily pre-
sumed to be correct.2' It is this presumption which
20 430 U.S. at 832.
21 The access right to federal courts can be traced back
to Ex pane Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1940). Justice Murphy,
writing for the Court, voided a state prison rule which
required the prisoner Hull to submit his federal habeas
corpus petition to a screening committee for approval.
2228 U.S.C. § 2254 (b) states:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf
of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of
a State court shall not be granted unless it appears
that the applicant has exhausted the remedies avail-
able in the courts of the State, or that there is either
an absence of available State corrective process or
the existence of circumstances rendering such process
ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner.
' Gibson v. Jackson, No. 77-59-Mac, slip op. at 7
(M.D. Ga. Dec. 16, 1977).
24 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d) states:
In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by
an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a
State court, a determination after a hearing on the
merits of a factual issue, made by a State court of
the district court felt would so adversely affect
Gibson's federal case.
Whether the federal statutory presumption of
correct factual determinations at the state level is
so difficult to overcome that an affirmative act on
the part of each state is required to guarantee
effective legal counsel, is an inquiry which warrants
closer inspection. Certainly if the federal govern-
ment is going to require states to provide attorneys
simply to assure the validity of a prior congressional
presumption, one can question whether there
should be such a factual presumption in the first
place. More importantly, the federal statutory ex-
ceptions to the federal presumption encompass the
very situation which the district court fears. That
is, the exceptions specifically cover situations where
there is a lack of a fair hearing at the state level:
[A] hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made
by a State court of competent jurisdiction ... shall
be presumed to be correct, unless the applicant shall
establish or it shall otherwise appear ....
(2) that the factfinding procedure employed by the
State court was not adequate to afford a full and
fair hearing;
(6) that the applicant did not receive a full, fair.
and adequate hearing in the State court proceed-
ing; ....
The district court in Gibson summarily dealt with
these exceptions and labelled them as "tech-
nical. 26 As such, the district court assumed that
Gibson would not be able to make effective use of
the statutory exceptions when he ultimately
reached the district court in his habeas proceeding.
The Gibson court has thus succeeded in extending
the Bounds decision in two important respects. First,
it has increased that which the state must affirm-
atively provide for some prisoners to insure their
meaningful access to the courts. That is, Georgia
must provide lawyers in complex cases, as well as
law libraries for all prisoners. Second, it has effec-
tively extended the meaningful access doctrine and
its requirement of affirmative action to include
state courts as well as federal courts. That is,
Georgia must now take affirmative steps not only
competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to which the
applicant for the writ and the State or an officer or
agent thereof were parties, evidenced by a written
opinion, or other reliable and adequate written in-
dicia, shall be presumed to be correct ....
2 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d).
2 Gibson v. Jackson, No. 77-59-Mac, slip op. at 5
(M.D. Ga. Dec. 16, 1977).
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with respect to federal courts, but also with respect
to some state court matters. Certainly, these are
logical progressions from the language of the Bounds
decision.
In choosing to rely on Bounds, the district court
picked the one recent Supreme Court case that
stands out as having extended rather than re-
stricted the rights of prisoners.27 The natural alter-
native, and certainly the more obvious one, would
have been to accomodate Gibson through Griffin v.
Illinois and its underlying equal protection analy-
sis.'s Together with the concern for procedural
safeguards in capital cases, as expressed in Gregg v.
Georgia,29 the district court could have fashioned an
alternative foundation for its decision to provide
Gibson, an indigent, with an attorney at state
expense.
As for the Ross decision, 30 which limited the
scope of an indigent's right to an attorney, it will
be remembered that the Court there only dealt
with discretionary appeals. The argument could
have been made that a collateral attack of a con-
viction, through the habeas process, is more closely
related to an appeal by right than to a discretionary
appeal. This is so, particularly because Georgia is
under no obligation to establish the habeas ma-
chinery with which to collaterally attack state con-
victions, but has chosen to do so voluntarily. Fur-
thermore, one of the underlying premises ofJustice
Rehnquist's opinion in Ross was that in discretion-
ary appeals, an indigent already has at his disposal
the briefs used in his appeals of right."5 In a habeas
proceeding, unlike a discretionary appeal, a peti-
tioner is raising matters he was unable to litigate
in a prior proceeding. He necessarily does not have
any "prior materials" at his disposal. As the Bounds
27 See generally Note, 68 J. CRIM. L. & C. 591 (1977).
2 351 U.S. 12 (1956). In Griffin, the Court held that
indigent petitioners convicted of a felony are entitled to
a free transcript for purposes of appellate review. "There
can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets
depends on the amount of money he has. Destitute
defendants must be afforded as adequate appellate review
as defendants who have money enough to buy tran-
scrl.ts." Id. at 19.
428 U.S. 153 (1976).
The basic procedural requirements under Gregg are:
(1) That there be sentencing guides, usually expressed in
terms of aggravating circumstances, to aid the sentencing
authority in making the decision whether to impose the
death penalty; and
(2) That there be a separate procedure at which the
defendant has an opportunity to bring any mitigating
circumstances to the attention of the sentencing author-
ity. See generaly Note, 67J. CRIM. L. & C. 437 (1976).3o See note 10 supra.
3' 417 U.S. at 615-16.
Court stated, "Rather than presenting claims that
have been passed on by two courts, [habeas pro-
ceedings] frequently raise heretofore .unlitigated
issues. As this Court has 'constantly emphasized,'
habeas corpus and civil rights actions are of 'fun-
damental importance ... in our constitutional
scheme' because they directly protect our most
valued rights."
' 2
The conclusion could then be reached, in spite
of the Ross decision, that indigent prisoners are
entitled to attorneys at the state's expense in their
habeas proceedings. The Gibson court, while allud-
ing to aspects of this analysis, avoided the direct
application of Griffin v. Illinois and its progeny. 3
This may prove to be wise judicial politics, partic-
ularly since the Ross decision has limited the equal
protection analysis of Griffin. Certainly the Su-
preme Court has adopted a decidedly reserved
approach to prisoner's rights. By relying on Bounds
v. Smith, the district court has seized upon a case so
recent that its rationale is more likely to be upheld
than the approach of the older Grifin line of cases.3
4
The Gibson court's extension of the spirit of Bounds
recognized the limits of simply providing legal
libraries for inmates. Gibson's situation is a "com-
plex case of dire consequences,"' 5 one in which his
life is on the line. As the court asserted:
[An] indigent petitioner if unrepresented by counsel
and without means to find and present evidence,
will be unable to present his side of his habeas
corpus case to the Butts County Superior Court. All
that will be heard by that court is what the State
with its superior legal and monetary resources pre-
sents or the presiding judge develops from the trial
transcript, the petitioner and the state's witnesses
and lawyers.
36
Furthermore, Gibson was first sentenced under the
very statute which was recently upheld in Gregg v.
Georgia,3 7 a case which emphasized the need for
procedural safeguards in any capital punishment
scheme. Given the fact that Georgia has under-
taken to provide a habeas process to which peti-
tioners may resort, it only seems reasonable that
such proceedings include competent legal advice.
'2430 U.S. at 827.
33 See note 34 infra.
' Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (indigent right
to a free transcript on appeal in a felony case); Douglas
v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (indigent right to free
counsel on appeal as of right in a felony case); Mayer v.
Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971) (indigent right to a free
transcript on appeal in a non-felony case).
3 Gibson v. Jackson, No. 77-39-Mac. slip op. at 16
(M.D. Ga. Dec. 16, 1977).
36 Id. at 12.
17 GA. COD- ANN. § 27-2534.1 (1975).
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JUDICIAL SUPERVISION OVER COVERT ENTRIES
The installation of an electronic eavesdropping
device (or "bug") often requires covert entry into
the targeted premises t Title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,2 which
governs the issuance of electronic surveillance or-
ders, does not expressly regulate covert entry, and
it has been held that Title III does not impliedly
prohibit covert entry3 But covert entry, neverthe-
less, is subject to the fourth amendment, and a
warrant must be obtained before a covert entry
may occur.4 Recently, in United States v. Ford,5
1 Entry is not always necessary in order to plant eaves-
dropping devices. For instance, devices may be attached
to the wall of an adjoining room, as in Goldman v.
United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942), or on the side of a
phone booth, as in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967). Covert entry is not a common phenomenon. Of
1,220 court ordered surveillances between 1968 and 1973,
only 26 involved eavesdropping devices, and of these 26,
presumably many did not involve covert entry. NA-
"rIONAL WIRETAP COMMISSION REPORT. Electronic Sur-
veillance 15, 43 (1976).
2 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Title III]. Congress is currently considering a proposed
recodification of Chapter 18. None of the proposed
changes affect the right of the police to make covert
entries. See H.R. 6869, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 3101-08
(1977), for the proposed recodification of the sections of
Title III pertaining to the issuance of electronic surveil-
lance orders.
3 United States v. Agrusa, 541 F.2d 690 (8th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1045 (1977), held that neither the
fourth amendment nor Title III prohibits covert entry to
plant eavesdropping devices.
4 The fourth amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
U.S. CONSTn amend. IV.
In Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961),
the Court held that the police could not enter premises
to plant eavesdropping devices. The federal agents in
Silverman did not physically enter the premises, but driled
a hole in an outside wall to implant a microphone into
the heating system. The search was held to be unconsti-
tutional because the police had entered a constitutionally
protected area. The Court stated that it had "never held
that a federal officer may without consent physically
entrench into a man's office or home, there secretly
observe or listen, and relate at the man's criminal trial
what was seen or heard." Id. at 511-12.5553 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
Application of United States,6 and United States v.
Scafidi,7 three federal courts of appeals have at-
tempted to define the minimum requirements that
must be met in the Title III intercept order, the
warrant governing entries to install bugs, and a
disagreement has developed among the circuits.
The disagreement concerns whether the judicial
officer must expressly authorize the covert entry in
the intercept order, and if so, just how much
judicial supervision of the covert entry operation
should be required.
In United States v. Ford, the Washington Metro-
politan Police suspected that a local store was a
center of narcotics activity. After normal investi-
gative methods failed to disclose the persons in-
volved, the police decided to install eavesdropping
devices. An affidavit complying with Title III was
prepared, and a surveillance order was obtained.8
The interception order contained a provision ex-
pressly authorizing covert entry. The entry provi-
sion, however, did not specify how many entries
could be made, nor did it specify the time or
manner of entry permitted.9 In effect then, no
limitations were placed on the police.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, in
an opinion written by Judge Skelly Wright, held
that the fourth amendment requires that a provi-
6 563 F.2d 637(4th Cir. 1977).
7564 F.2d 633 (2d. Cir. 1977).
a The intercept order was not issued pursuant to Title
III, but to a District of Columbia statute, 23 D.C. Code
§§ 541-56 (1973). The court stated that the D.C. statute
varies only in minor respects from the federal statute. 553
F.2d at 148, n.4. None of these variations had any affect
on the court's decision. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 states the
procedure to be followed in applying for an electronic
intercept order. The applicant must show that other
investigative methods are inadequate, 18 U.S.C. §
2518(I)(c), and the order must state that interception
may last only so long as necessary to achieve the objective
of the order, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5). The order in Ford met
both of these requirements.
9 The intercept order read:
Members of the Metropolitan Police Department
are hereby authorized to enter and re-enter the Meljer-
veen Shoe Circus ... for the purpose of installing,
maintaining, and removing the electronic eavesdrop-
ping devices. Entry and re-entry may be accomplished in
any manner, including, but not limited to, breaking and
entering or other surreptitious entry, or entry and re-enty by
ruse or strategem.
553 F.2d at 149-50 (emphasis in opinion).
Vol. 69, No. 3
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sion expressly authorizing covert entry must be
included in the intercept order.1l The court prin-
cipally relied on Silverman v. United States1 and Katz
v. United States12 in reaching this conclusion. The
Court in Silverman had held that a warrant must be
obtained before the police could make a covert
entry to plant eavesdropping devices.' a In Katz, the
Court applied the amendment's protection against
the seizure of private conversations in deciding that
a warrant must be obtained before a private con-
versation can be seized, whether or not a physical
trespass was necessary to affect the seizure.
14
"°The court of appeals affirmed the district court,
which had suppressed the evidence in a pre-trial ruling.
The district court reasoned that the absence of statutory
restrictions, combined with the continuous and indiscrim-
inate nature of the seizure, placed an extraordinarily
heavy burden on the judicial officer to tailor his order
narrowly and therefore minimize the intrusion. 414 F.
Supp. 879 (D.D.C. 1976). Appellate jurisdiction was
based on 23 D.C. Code § 552 (1973), a provision similar
to 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(b), which authorizes appeals
from orders suppressing intercepted communications.
" 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
12 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
13 See note 4 supra. In Silverman, the police drilled a hole
in an outside wall and inserted a microphone until it
touched a heating duct, thus converting the building's
entire heating system into a conductor of sound. A war-
rant was required because by penetrating the outer wall
of the building, the agents had intruded upon a consti-
tutionally protected area. Prior to Katz, if penetration
had not occurred, there would have been no fourth
amendment violation. See, e.g., Goldman v. United States,
316 U.S. 129 (1942), where the placing of a bug upon the
wall of an adjoining room did not violate the fourth
amendment.
14 In Katz, the FBI attached a bug to the outer wall of
a phone booth. The device was turned on whenever Katz
was inside. No warrant was obtained. The Court held
that a warrant was required and stated that the fourth
amendment protects "people and not simply areas," and
therefore, a trespassory intrusion is not required in all
cases to trigger the amendment's protection. 389 U.S. at
353. Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion, character-
ized the decision as granting fourth amendment protec-
tion of those interests over which an individual has a
reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. at 360-62 (Harlan,
J., concurring). Recent decisions of the Supreme Court
have purportedly applied this principle. See, e.g., United
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440-43 (1976) (defendant
has no legitimate expectation of privacy as to his bank
records). Implicit in Katz, the Ford court stated, is the
rationale that "any intrusion must be limited to that
minimally necessary to effectively carry out the order's
purpose." 553 F.2d at 158. Although the limits of Katz
are unclear, it is certain that the decision prohibits war-
rantless electronic interception of conversations emanat-
ing from within a private premises. For a discussion of
the importance of Katz, see Amsterdam, Perspectives on the
Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349 (1974).
On the basis of those decisions, the Ford court
reasoned that two constitutionally protected pri-
vacy interests are implicated when the police cov-
ertly enter premises to plant eavesdropping devices:
the right against governmental seizure of conver-
sations and the right against governmental intru-
sion into a home or business. The court maintained
that an interception order not containing a provi-
sion expressly authorizing covert entry is violative
of the fourth amendment, because by requiring in
Katz that a warrant be obtained to seize conversa-
tions, the Supreme Court did not intend to reduce
the protection against trespassory intrusion estab-
lished in Silverman.15 The Silverman requirement that
a warrant expressly authorize a covert entry had to
be followed. The court thus concluded that both
the seizure of conversations and the entry itself
must be separately tested against the fourth
amendment standards of reasonableness.' 6 In ad-
dition; express judicial authorization must be ob-
tained both for the entry, pursuant to Silverman,
and for the seizure of conversations, pursuant to
Katz.
Although an entry provision was included in the
Ford intercept order, the court held that it was
impermissibly broad. The court stated that "the
main purpose of the fourth amendment's warrant
requirement is to protect the citizen's right to
privacy, and that this right of privacy could be
best protected if a neutral officer tailored the order
to permit seizure of conversations by the least
intrusive means possible."' 7 The court then noted
that the affidavit in this case, while justifying
authorization of a covert entry, did not justify the
issuance of an entry order giving the police "free-
dom to make multiple entries at any time of day
or night, by any means they believed necessary."'
8
According to the court, the judicial officer should
only authorize "those entries and those means of
entry necessary to satisfy the demonstrated and
cognizable needs of the applicant."' 9 The court,
however, did not explain what specific provisions




15 The court stated that Katz "was intended to expand
the scope of the amendment's protection and not to
diminish existing safeguards against unwarranted inva-
sions of physical privacy." 553 F.2d at 157.6 Id. at 161-62.
17 The court reasoned that this was the implication of
Katz. 553 F.2d at 158.
'8 553 F.2d at 169-70.
'9 Id. at 170.
2 An additional issue addressed by the court was
[Vol. 69
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In Application of United States,2' the FBI deter-
mined, while investigating an alleged bookmaking
operation, that eavesdropping was needed to fur-
ther the investigation. A detailed affidavit propos-
ing restrictions on the method and timing of the
covert entry was prepared. Reversing a district
court decision denying the requested order, the
Fourth Circuit held that an express entry provision
must be included in the intercept order, but as in
Ford, did not specify what particular terms should
be included in the entry provision.2 The court
adopted a different rationale than the Ford court
in reaching this conclusion. Rather than stating
that the trespassory and non-trespassory intrusion
must be separately tested against the fourth
amendment warrant requirement, the court rea-
soned that since covert entry to plant eavesdrop-
ping devices involves a greater constitutional intru-
sion than a normal wiretap order, the government
must present greater justification. In addition, the
court claimed that a covert entry provision is nec-
essary to limit the entry to that justified by the
government's affidavit.23 The court believed that
covert entry involves a greater constitutional intru-
sion than a normal wiretap, since by means of a
covert entry officers are able to see and possibly
seize items not seen in a non-trespassory intrusion.
whether Title III mandated suppression of the seized
conversations. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a) requires suppres-
sion of communications that are unlawfully seized. Ford
states that communications seized in violation of the
fourth amendment are unlawfully seized within the
meaning of the statute, and Title III would thus require
their suppression. Title III thus regulates covert entry,
but only if there is a concomitant constitutional violation.
553 F.2d at 170-74.
21 563 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1977).
22 Appellatejurisdiction was based on 18 U.S.C. § 1291
(1970). The court found that the denial of an application
for an intercept order was a final decision within the
meaning of that statute. Section 1291 authorizes appeals
from "final decisions" of federal district courts.
The district court had denied the requested order,
holding 'that Title III required that the government
demonstrate a compelling interest before covert entry
could be authorized. The court of appeals, finding noth-
ing in the legislative history to indicate that Congress
intended that any higher standard be placed on the
government than the fourth amendment standard of
reasonableness, rejected the district court's holding. The
appellate court found that a major purpose of Title III
was to give federal investigators a valuable tool to combat
organized crime, and requiring that a higher burden be
met than the fourth amendment standard of reasonable-
ness before a covert entry can be authorized, would
frustrate this intent. 563 F.2d at 642-43.
3 Id. at 643-44.24 Id. at 643, n.6.
According to the court, to limit the scope of the
entry to the justification presented, the fourth
amendment demands that the judge be informed
of the planned entry, that covert entry be the only
feasible means to continue the government's inves-
tigation, and that the judge specifically limit the
entry in a manner not violative of the fourth
amendment's standard of reasonableness.ss The
court did not state what minimal restrictions are
necessary before an entry provision would be up-
held, but it did say that the restrictions proposed
by the government in the instant case would be
approved. 26 Unfortunately, the specifics of the gov-
ernment's proposed restrictions were not available,
since the district court's records were under seal to
protect the secrecy of the government's investiga-
tion.
In United States v. Scafidi,28 the defendants were
convicted of running an illegal gambling business.
Bugs were installed at the Hiway Lounge pursuant
to three intercept orders, and several entries were
made to plant the bugs, to reposition them and to
replace the batteries.29 The intercept order in ques-
tion did not expressly authorize covert entry, but
the Second Circuit held that an electronic surveil-
lance order need not contain express authorization
to break into the premises. Still, the court did not
imply that covert entry is an exception to the
warrant requirement. Rather, the court stated that
the authority to break into the premises in the
instant case was implied from the order specifically
authorizing the interception of oral communica-
tions only. The court noted that "[t]here is implicit
in the court's order, concomitant authorization for
agents to covertly enter the premises and install the
necessary equipment." 3 Unlike the courts in Ford
and Application of United States, however, the court
in Scafidi stated that it was not necessary for the
authorizing judge to limit the scope of the covert
25Id. at 644.26 1d. at 645.
2 Since the appeal arose from the denial of an appli-
cation for an intercept order, to preserve the secrecy of
the government's investigation, the district court record
was sealed, and thus little can be said about the factual
background of the case, or the particulars of the govern-
ment's proposed restrictions on covert entry.
2 564 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1977).
2 Entry was gained by means of a passkey. United
States v. Altese, No. 75-CR-341, slip op. at 4, 46, 51-52
(E.D.N.Y., filed Oct. 14, 1976) (unreported opinion), afl'd
sub nom, United States v. Scafidi, 564 F.2d 633 (2d Cir.
1977).




entry operation. The court reasoned that decisions
as to the time and method of entry, and to the
number of entries to be made, require expertise
outside the judiciary's competence, often could be
made only at the last moment, and almost certainly
would require on-the-spot investigation by the
judge.3' Although the court held that the judicial
officer need not approve the number and method
of the entries, the court seemed to imply that the
fourth amendment standard of reasonableness'does
restrict the actions of the police. Although the
police entered the premises several times to plant,
repair, and replace the bugs, the intrusion into the
targeted premises in this case was "no greater than





Scafidi, Ford, and Application of United States are
consistent in their requirement that the actions of
the police, in making a covert entry, will be subject
to the fourth amendment's standard of reasonable-
ness. The cases are in conflict, however, with regard
to the degree of judicial supervision mandated by
the fourth amendment warrant requirement, and
to the question of whether this judicial supervision
must be express or implied.33 Scafidi says that ju-
dicial authorization may be implied from an order
on its face limited to the seizure of conversations,
and vigorously states that the judicial officer is not
competent to exercise any supervision other than
the initial authorization. Application of United States
and Ford, on the other hand, require that a covert
entry be expressly authorized, and that the judge
tailor the covert entry provision so that the consti-
tutional intrusion is no greater than that minimally
necessary to affect the seizure of the offending
conversations. Unfortunately, both Ford and Appli-
cation of United States fail to consider the practical
problems which result from this minimal intrusion
test.
It has been argued that if Ford and Application of
United States are interpreted too strictly, the police
31 Id. at 640.
32 Id.
33 A number of district courts, in addition to the district
courts in Ford, Scafidi, and Application of United States, have
considered the question of whether express authorization
is necessary for a covert entry. See United States v. Volpe,
430 F. Supp. 931 (D. Conn. 1977) (entry provision not
required); United States v. Finazzo, 429 F. Supp. 803
(E.D. Mich. 1977) (entry provision required); United
States v. Dalia, 426 F. Supp. 862 (D.N.J. 1977) (entry
provision not required): United States v. London, 424 F.
Supp. 556 (D. Md. 1976), ajfd on other grounds sub non,
United States v. Clerkley, 556 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1977)
(entry provision not required).
may be frustrated in their ability to carry out
effectively a covert entry operation3 4 To accom-
plish a surreptitious entry, it is necessary for the
police to make extensive surveys of the targeted
premises. However, an internal survey of the prem-
ises is usually not possible, and therefore, it may be
impossible for the police to obtain complete infor-
mation.35 Moreover, a variety of circumstances
may force last minute changes. For instance,
weather may cause changes in crowd patterns, or
a suspect's established patterns may change, or
sudden interruptions may force a retreat before
installation can be completed.36 Furthermore, once
the bugs are installed, it may be necessary to re-
enter the target to replace defective equipment,
replace batteries and reposition the devices.3 7 For
these reasons the police may be hindered in their
attempts to obtain an intercept order since the
judge may not have sufficient information with
which to make intelligent decisions, and any re-
strictions he may impose in the order may quickly
become outdated.ss In addition, because of delays
in obtaining authority for re-entries, incriminating
conversations may be lost.
A better solution, which would alleviate the
practical difficulties faced by the police, might be
to accept Scafidi and leave the decision as to the
number, method, time, and scope of the resulting
intrusion to the discretion of the police. However,
an express entry provision would also be required,
as in Ford and Application of United States. The
express provision safeguards the defendant's rights
by making sure that no covert operation com-
mences unless the judge has explicitly found the
See McNamara, The Problem of Surreptitious Entry To
Effectuate Electronic Eavesdrop: flow Do You Proceed After the
Court Says "Yes," 15 AM. CRIM. L. Rivv. 1 (1977). Mc-
Namara argued the government's cause in Ford. For a
discussion of the practical difficulties of covert entry, and
a proposed procedure that would balance the needs of
the police against the rights of defendants, see nn.34-39
and accompanying text.
35 McNamara, supra note 34, at 3 & nn.7 & 8.
36 Id. at 4 & n.9.
37Id. at 4 & n.1.
8 The practical realities and tactical considerations
of any covert entry are not only beyond the expertise
of a judicial officer, but also would require him, if
the critical flexibility is to be guaranteed, to stay
with the entry team from the time the eavesdrop
order is signed until it is executed, directly supervis-
ing each step, resolving every problem that may
arise, and making tactical judgments as to the final
entry method in an area in which his expertise and
experience are plainly deficient. Id. at 15, n.67.
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commencement of a covert entry operation justi-
fied. The additional protection of the defendant's
rights, by adoption of a requirement that an ex-
press entry provision be included in the intercept
order, would more than offset the slight additional
burden placed on the government. Under this
solution, the actions of the police in conducting the
operation would still be subject to fourth amend-
ment standards of reasonableness during post-sei-
zure review, and the fourth amendment warrant
requirement would not be extended to a point
where covert entry, a most effective law enforce-
ment tool, would no longer be feasible.
39
It may be that the courts adopting the rationale
of Ford and Application of United States, however, will
require a greater degree ofjudicial supervision over
9 McNamara suggests that an entry provision be in-
cluded to make it clear that the judge has authorized
covert entry, and that each entry be approved by the
judicial officer. The recommended entry provision would
leave the method of entry to the discretion of the police,
and would provide that subsequent entries could be made
without prior approval if delay would prejudice the
success of the entry, as long as the judge was notified
within 48 hours. Id. at 27-28.
covert entry than suggested by the above solution.
However, that degree of supervision need not be as
great as contemplated by the dictum in the two
decisions that the time and method of entry would
have to be regulated. 0 Based on the test that the
intrusion shall be limited to that minimally neces-
sary, it is probable that the courts will leave the
method and timing of entry, decisions which do not
affect the total intrusion, to the discretion of the
police. Regarding the number of entries that may
be made during the life of the intercept order and
the total canvassing of the premises needed to plant
the bugs, decisions that do affect the total intrusion,
it is likely that the courts will require judicial
approval. However, the courts should establish
exceptions to these requirements where substantial
delays in obtaining judicial authorization or the
impossibility of obtaining complete information,
would frustrate the government's investigation.
o Ford suggests that the time and meth6d of entry may
need to be regulated. 553 F.2d at 170. Application of United
States does so only obliquely by stating that the restric-
tions in the government's proposed order would be up-
held. 563 F.2d at 645.
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CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS DURING THE SENTENCING PROCEEDING
In United States v. Fatico,' the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of New York
was presented with an opportunity to extend the
trend of recent cases toward guaranteeing a de-
fendant's constitutional protections during sent-
encing. In that case, the court confronted the due
process and right of confrontation issues of whether
evidence used in determining the defendants' sen-
tence was reliable, and whether the defendants
were afforded an adequate opportunity to rebut
the evidence.
The defendants in Fatico pleaded guilty to a
charge of conspiring to hijack trucks. During the
sentencing proceeding, the defendants objected to
a presentence report linking them to organized
crime. The information concerning the defendants'
affiliation with organized crime was allegedly ob-
tained by an FBI agent "based upon information
furnished to him by a confidential informant who
allegedly is a member of the Gambino Family and
who has previously supplied reliable information."
3
The defendants sought to cross-examine the FBI
agent, but the prosecution objected on the ground
that any cross-examination would jeopardize the
confidentiality of the agent's source and jeopardize
the informant's life. To ensure that the defendants
had an opportunity to refute the evidence and be
sentenced upon reliable information, the court held
that the Government must disclose the name of the
informer. Judge Weinstein, writing the opinion for
the court, used a balancing approach, weighing
society's interests against the individual defend-
ant's rights, to protect the defendants from possible
injustice in sentencing.
This concern of the Fatico court, for safeguarding
a defendant's rights during the sentencing aspect
of a criminal proceeding, represents the latest pro-
tective movement in an area that historically has
afforded little protection to the convicted defend-
441 F. Supp. 1285 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
2The defendants were initially charged with three
indictments stemming from three hijackings occurring in
February and March of 1971. The initial indictment,
charging the defendants with conspiracy to receive and
with receiving goods stolen from interstate commerce was
aborted, however, when the jury failed to reach a verdict.
The defendants then pleaded guilty to the conspiracy
charge in the second indictment in satisfaction of all
charges against them. Id. at 1288.
3 Id.
ant. The judiciary's reluctance to find constitu-
tional violations of a defendant's rights during the
sentencing proceeding can be traced to Williams v.
New York.4 In Williams, the Supreme Court of the
United States considered whether a defendant was
denied due process of law where the judge imposed
the death sentence based upon evidence in the
presentence report which was inadmissible at trial.5
In upholding the sentence, Justice Black, writing
the opinion for the Court, stated that:
[W]e do not think the Federal Constitution restricts
the view of the sentencing judge to the information
received in open court. The due process clause
should not be treated as a device for freezing the
evidential procedure of sentencing in the mold of
trial procedure. So to treat the due process clause
would hinder if not preclude all courts-state and
federal-from making progressive efforts to improve
the administration of criminal justice.6
In reaching its determination, the Williams Court
relied upon the notion that punishment for crimes
is to be determined on an individual basis, and
hence all information is relevant to the issue,
notwithstanding the rules of evidence and strict
due process considerations.7
The Williams Court's failure to find a due process
violation represented a marked departure from the
earlier Supreme Court decision of Townsend v.
Burke.8 In Townsend, the Court found a due process
violation where the defendant, who was disadvan-
taged by lack of counsel, was sentenced on the basis
of untrue assumptions concerning his prior criminal
record.9 In an attempt to reconcile the two opin-
4337 U.S. 241 (1949).
5 Id. at 244.6 Id. at 251. For a legislative enactment which seemed
to incorporate the philosophy of the Williams holding, see
the Organized Crime Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. § 3577
(1970), which states that "[n]o limitation shall be placed
on the information concerning the background, character
and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a
court of the United States may receive and consider for
the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence."
7337 U.S. at 247, 251. See also FED. R. EVID. 1101
(d)(3) which states that the federal rules are inapplicable
at the sentencing stage of a criminal prosecution.
s 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
9 In Townsend, the trial court, during sentencing, relied
upon prior charges against the defendant, even though
the defendant had been found not guilty. Id. at 739-41.
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ions, the Court in Williams, in a footnote, stated
that "[w]hat we have said is not to be accepted as
a holding that the sentencing procedure is immune
from scrutiny under the due process clause."
10
The two cases, nonetheless, can be distinguished
on the basis of a reliability concept, the same
concept upon which the court in Fatico focuses. In
Townsend, the Court based its decision upon the
fact that the defendant was sentenced as a result of
false and totally unreliable information. In Wil-
liams, on the other hand, the key factor appears to
be that the defendant did not attempt to refute
any of the additional information upon which the
judge relied, the inference being that the informa-
tion was thus reliable and true."
Extending this analysis one step further, it ap-
pears that the Court in Williams imposed a duty
upon the defendant to challenge any inaccuracies
in the presentence report upon which the judge
relies. Absent such a challenge, the Court will
apparently assume that the information is reliable
and refuse to apply due process considerations.
The Williams opinion, however, gives no indica-
tion as to whether the burden imposed upon the
defendant is merely to attempt to refute the evi-
dence, or whether the defendant must show that
the evidence is untrue. The Ninth Circuit, in United
States v. Weston," confronted this issue, and refused
to place the burden upon the defendant to prove
that the information from an anonymous inform-
ant was inaccurate. Instead the court held that the
defendant's mere contest of the evidence was suf-
ficient. In Weston, the defendant objected to the use
of allegedly inaccurate information in determining
the sentence to be imposed. There, the defendant
A similar situation arose in United States v. Tucker, 404
U.S. 443 (1972), where an accused was given a maximum
sentence because of the judge's reliance upon three prior
felony convictions. The Supreme Court affirmed the
decision of the Ninth Circuit in remanding the case for
resentencing due to the determination that the three
prior convictions were illegal in light of Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), and the defendant's right to
counsel.
10337 U.S. 241, 252 n.18 (1949).
" See United States v. Bass, 535 F.2d 110, 121 (D.C.
Cir. 1976), where the court held that "the absence of a
denial itself provides an important indicia of reliability."
In Bass, the court refused to vacate the lower court's
sentence imposed upon the appellant, where the appel-
lant did not even attempt to dispute the truthfulness of
various allegations made by the prosecution during the
sentencing proceeding.
12448 F.2d 626 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1061
(1971).
was convicted of receiving, concealing and facili-
tating the transportation of heroin, for which the
trial judge recommended the minimum sentence of
five years. However, before the sentence was im-
posed, a presentence report which relied upon an
anonymous informer, detailed the defendant's al-
leged involvement in other crimes. Based upon this
report, the judge gave the defendant an additional
sentence of fifteen years.
In distinguishing the Ninth Circuit's approach
in Weston from Williams, the key factor again ap-
pears to have been the reliability of the information
used in the sentencing proceeding. In Weston, the
court took notice of the defendant's vigorous denial
of the information contained in the presentence
report, a denial casting doubt upon the reliability
of the information used. Nevertheless, unlike in
Townsend, the court did not rule that the informa-
tion was inaccurate, but appeared to be saying that
the mere challenge of the information used was
enough to cast doubt upon its reliability and hence
preclude its use against the defendant. The court,
however, in an attempt to follow Townsend's line of
reasoning, stated that "[w]e extend it [Townsend]
but little in holding that a sentence cannot be
predicated on information of so little value as that
here involved. A rational penal system must have
some concern for the probable accuracy of the
informational inputs in the sentencing process."
13
The implications stemming from the Weston case
are enormous. As the dissent in Weston pointed out:
"[The majority disclaims a repudiation of the rule
of these cases [Williams and Townsend], but in sub-
stance opens up Pandora's box on procedures in
the trial court in the use of a presentence report."' 4
The notion that contested information must be
excluded from the sentencing report was a far cry
from the Supreme Court decisions concerning the
defendant's safeguards during sentencing, and has
not gained universal acceptance in other jurisdic-
tions.1
5
'3 Id. at 634.
'4 Id.
" In United States v. Metz, 470 F.2d 1140 (3d Cir.
1972), cert. denied sub nom, Davenport v. United States,
411 U.S. 919 (1973), the court distinguished Weston on
the basis of the reliability of the evidence used, and held
that the sentencing judge can consider pending indict-
ments for other crimes in determining the defendant's
sentence for his current criminal activity. The Metz court
used a reliability of the evidence test in holding that the
indictments were a reliable source of information even
though the defendant contended that his "presumption
of innocence is affronted by the consideration of unproved
criminal activity." ld at 1142.
36"ff--
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The reliability concept was extended one step
further in the recent United States Supreme Court
decision, Gardner v. Florida.ts In Gardner, the Court
held that the petitioner was denied due process of
law when the death sentence was imposed, since
the petitioner had no opportunity to deny or ex-
plain the confidential portion of the presentence
report and thereby no chance to sway the trial
judge to accept the jury's determination thata life
sentence should be imposed. 7 In this case, the
confidential information in the presentence inves-
tigation report was neither disclosed to nor re-
quested by defense counsel.
The Court in Gardner expanded its focus upon
the reliability concept to include a consideration as
to whether the opportunity existed for the defend-
ant to refute the information, as well as whether
the defendant challenged the presentence report.
In Gardner, since the information used in imposing
the harsher sentence was not disclosed to the de-
fendant, no inference of the information's reliabil-
ity could be drawn from the defendant's inability
to refute the information, and thus the Court was
unwilling to uphold the petitioner's death sen-
tence.
18
In United States v. Needles, 472 F.2d 652 (2d Cir.
1973), the defendant contested an allegation in the pre-
sentence report that he was involved in the widespread
manufacture and sale of firearms.
It does not follow ... that an evidentiary hearing
must be held whenever a defendant asserts the falsity
of some statement in his pre-sentence report....
[Tihere is no definitive set of criteria and no required
weight to be allocated to each consideration; many
of the matters received cannot readily be measured,
quantified, proved or disproved; and some come
from confidential sources. Hence it has not been
required that each statement in a pre-sentence report
be established or refuted on presentation of evidence.
Id. at 657-58. The court, however, even though the de-
fendant contested the information in the report, affirmed
his sentence since the report was fully corroborated.
Based upon this corroboration, the court distinguished
Needles from Weston and stated that "even if Weston were
controlling authority in this circuit, we do not think it
would require a remand here for resentencing." Id. at
659.
16 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
17Id. at 362.
18 The Gardner Court also justified its decision in terms
of a restructuring of capital sentencing procedures. Like
Williams, Gardner involved the imposition of the death
sentence on a defendant notwithstanding the jury's rec-
ommendation of life imprisonment. The Court, in a
further attempt to distinguish the two cases, traced the
recognition since Williams of the constitutional difference
between the death penalty and lesser punishments. Id. at
1204-05. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976);
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). The Court's
The Gardner Court, however, failed to highlight
adequately the relative importance of a defense
counsel's failure to refute the presentence report, as
in Williams, as opposed to the defendant's failure
to request the full presentence report. Logically, if
the key determinant in a due process issue is the
reliability of the information used in the sentencing
proceeding, as the Court implies, then the fact that
the defense does not even seek to examine the entire
report becomes as crucial as whether the defendant
refutes the information in the presentence report.
From a reliability standpoint, the failure to refute
the information in the presentence report is a
stronger indication of reliability than the failure to
request the disclosure of the report. Yet, if one
views Williams as saying that a defendant's waiver
of his right to refute the contents of the report is
indicative of reliability, then waiver of the right to
request disclosure of the report can also be read as
imposing a presumption of reliability on the infor-
mation, thus cutting off due process considerations.
In United States v. Fatico, the court also concen-
trated upon the reliability concept and expanded
the focus for determining reliability even further
than Gardner. The Fatico court looked to the totality
of circumstances rather thanjust to the defendant's
actions or inactions to decide whether certain in-
formation should be considered during sentencing.
This expansion is reflected in the court's overall
concern for ensuring justice. As the court noted,
"[w]hat is required is a sound judicial sense for
what is essential to protect a defendant against
injustice in sentencing."2' 0 The court recognized
that safeguards concerning the admission of evi-
dence were either too restrictive, or not protective
enough, of the defendant, and thus believed that
a flexible, discretionary approach should be uti-
lized.
The approach utilized in Fatico appears to be a
balancing test, as the court weighed society's inter-
est in protecting itself from the criminally con-
victed against the individual defendant's interest
in preserving his constitutional rights. This ap-
proach represents a departure from earlier cases
where less consideration was given to the individual
defendant's rights.
While applying this balancing approach to safe-
guard the defendant's due process rights during
analysis and focus on the death penalty, however, has
been read as limiting its holding to only capital cases.
United States v. Fatico, 441 F. Supp. at 1291.
'9 Id. at 1293-94.
2o Id. at 1295.
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sentencing, the Fatico court was confronted with
the issue of the defendant's right to confrontation
under the sixth amendment.2 ' The Supreme Court
had held in Morrissey v. Brewer2 that minimum
requirements of due process include the right to
confront and cross examine adverse witnesses.23 In
Morrissey, the Court was confronted with a due
process claim based upon an individual's alleged
right to be heard before his parole is revoked. In
deciding whether any procedural protections were
due, the Court looked to the "extent to which an
individual will be 'condemned to suffer grevious
loss,'"" and held that due process considerations
are flexible, depending upon the particular situa-
tion. 25
In finding support for its conclusion that the
defendant's sixth amendment right to confronta-
tion applies to the post-conviction sentencing pro-
ceeding, the court in Fatico referred to the Morriss'
parole revocation situation. Both situations in-
volved the possible loss of liberty to the defendant
after the initial determination of guilt and inno-
cence, but since both situations were not part of
the actual criminal prosecution, the full spectra of
rights due a defendant may not apply.2 6 Therefore,
as in Morrissey, since the witness in Fatico possessed
crucial information concerning the defendants' fu-
ture liberty, the Fatico court, as part of its overall
concern for justice. held that the right to cross
examination existed in the sentencing proceeding.
2 7
The court reasoned:
[T]he government cannot affirmatively prevent the
defendant from examining under oath a declarant
when a declarant's knowledge is offered by the
government (1) at a critical stage of the criminal
processlssl (2) as to crucial information that (3)
21 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against
him .... " U.S. COMs'. amend. VI.
"2408 U.S. 471 (1972).
23 Id. at 489.24 Id. at 481.
2 Id.26 Id. at 480.
27441 F. Supp. at 1297.
28 In Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 129, 134 (1967), the
Supreme Court stated that "Townsend n. Burke ... illus-
trates the critical nature of sentencing in a criminal case
and might well be considered to support by itself a
holding that the right to counsel applies at sentencing."
In Mempa, the Court was presented with the issue of the
right to counsel in a sentencing proceeding which had
been deferred subject to probation.
The critical nature of the sentencing process becomes
apparent when one considers that "the vast majority of
defendants plead guilty: for them the only significant
directly affects a substantial liberty interest of the
defendant. To deny defendant access to an inform-
ant whose declarations are introduced as evidence
is to affirmatively prevent the defendant from ex-
amining him. This requirement does not unduly
burden the sentencing or other critical criminal
process, but it does afford the defendant his consti-
tutional mandated protection of confrontation.29
The defendants' confrontation rights were fur-
ther complicated by the claim of an informer priv-
ilege. The right to confrontation of adverse wit-
nesses had been subjected to the claim of informer
privilege in Roviaro v. United States.30 In that case,
the Supreme Court gave effect to the informer
privilege, the purpose of which is to encourage
communication of alleged crimes by the public to
the police force.3 ' In Roviaro, the petitioner was
indicted for selling and transporting heroin based
upon the testimony of an anonymous informer. In
refusing to invoke the informer privilege, the Court
applied a flexible balancing approach and held:
[Tihe applicability of the privilege arises from the
fundamental requirements of fairness. Where the
disclosure of an informer's identity, or of the con-
tents of his communication, is relevant and helpful
to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair
determination of a cause, the privilege must give
way. In these situations the trial court may require
disclosure and, if the Government withholds the
information, dismiss the action a2
The Court continued by saying that no fixed rule
with respect to the informer privilege is applicable
and that a balancing test weighing the confiden-
tiality of the source of information against the
defendant's individual rights must be applied, de-
pending on the circumstances of each individual
case.
33
formal procedures of criminal administration are those
culminating in the sentence, and it is often the sentence
and not the conviction on which plea bargaining and
other elements of a typical criminal defense focus." 81
HARV. L. REV. 821 (1968).
29441 F. Supp. at 1297.
"o 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
31 Id. at 60-61.
SId.
33 Id. In an apparent furtherance of the Roviaro test, the
American Bar Association's approved draft of sentencing
alternatives and procedures, which the Fatico court cites,
states that:
[In extraordinary cases, the court should be permit-
ted to except from disclosure parts of the report
which are not relevant to a proper sentence, diag-
nostic opinion which might seriously disrupt a pro-
gram of rehabilitation, or sources of information
1978]
RIGHTS DURING SENTENCING
In applying the Roviaro test to the facts in Fatico,
the district court concluded that since the in-
former's information directly affected a substantial
liberty interest of the defendant, the prosecutor
must disclose the informer's identity or be pre-
cluded from presenting the information to the
court. The Fatico court's reliance upon the flexible
balancing test of Roviaro is consistent with the
Supreme Court's generally flexible approach to the
entire presentence proceeding.
which has [sic] been obtained on a promise of con-
fidentiality. In all cases where parts of the report are
not disclosed under such authority, the court should
be required to state for the record the reason for its
actions and to inform the defendant and his attorney
that information has not been disclosed. The action
of the court in excepting information from disclosure
should be subject to appellate review."
ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMI-
NAt. JUSTICE, Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures,
§ 4.4, at 214 (Approved Draft 1968).
The requirement for stating for the record why the
information was not disclosed, according to the comments
to the draft, is to prevent abuse, by making the nondis-
closure of presentencing information a burdensome task,
notwithstanding the risk that certain information that
should be protected, would not be. Id. at 225. But see
United States v. Holder, 412 F.2d 212 (2d Cir. 1969),
which held that there is no abuse of discretion where the
In sum, the Fatico court capitalized upon the
opportunity to extend the trend of recent cases
toward guaranteeing a defendant's constitutional
protection during sentencing. The court focused
upon the totality of circumstances in determining
whether evidence was reliable and could thus be
used by a judge in determining a defendant's
sentence. Similarly, the court's attitude toward
ensuring that the defendant's constitutional rights
were protected was reflected in its flexible appli-
cation of the rules regarding the informer privilege.
trial judge, based upon no apparent reason, refuses to
disclose the presentence report. See also New Jersey v.
Kunz, 55 N.J. 128, 259 A.2d 895 (1969); Annot. 40
A.L.R.3d 681 (1971).
The argument that an assurance of confidentiality is
essential to enable investigators to obtain information
relevant to the defendants and that the possible disclosure
of such information would have an adverse effect on the
informational gathering process has been espoused by
some in favor of non-disclosure of presentencing reports.
See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358-59 (1977). This
fear, however, that sources of information will dry up
upon disclosure of the presentence report has been criti-
cized by different -studies as having no factual basis. ABA
PROJECG'ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL.Jus-
"ricF, Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures, 219-20.
(Approved Draft, 1968); New Jersey v. Kunz, 55 N.J.
128, 259 A.2d 895 (1969).
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THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF THE SWASTIKA
The Illinois Supreme Court has "reluctantly"'
held that the first amendment protects the rights
of neo-Nazis to display the swastika during a pro-
test march in a predominantly Jewish suburb of
Chicago. In Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party
of America,2 the court held that the village had not
met its "heavy burden" of justifying a prior re-
straint on speech-a drastic and presumptively
unconstitutional prohibition of expression.3 The
court overturned the injunction which prohibited
the Nazis from "[i]ntentionally displaying the swas-
tika on or off their persons, in the course of a
demonstration, march or parade" in the village.
4
Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of Amer-
ica, 69 Il1. 2d 605, 619, 373 N.E.2d 21, 26 (1978).
269 Ill. 2d 605, 373 N.E.2d 21 (1978).
3 Id. at 612, 373 N.E.2d at 23. The strong presumption
against prior restraint of first amendment rights has been
considered black letter law at least since Near v. Minne-
sota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), invalidating an injunction
against publication of materials considered libelous and
anti-Semitic. Other examples of the United States Su-
preme Court's refusal to approve of prior restraints in-
clude Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S.
415 (1971) (prior restraint on distribution of leaflets
considered unjustified by privacy interests asserted by a
real estate broker described in the leaflets as a block
buster and panic peddler), and New York Times v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (even classified gov-
ernment documents such as the Pentagon Papers may
not be previously restrained).
4 51 111. App. 3d 279, 295, 366 N.E.2d 347, 359 (1977).
A broader injunction had been issued by the trial court,
prohibiting defendant Nazis from:
[marching, walking or parading or otherwise dis-
playing ... the swastika on or off their person; Dis-
tributing pamphlets or displaying any materials
which incite or promote hatred against persons of
Jewish faith or ancestry or hatred against persons of
any faith or ancestry, race or religion [within the
village of Skokie].
Id. at 281-85, 366 N.E.2d at 351. Defendants' subsequent
motion for a stay of the injunction was denied by the trial
court and the Illinois Supreme Court. The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari June 14, 1977, reversed
the denial of a stay and remanded for immediate appel-
late review or a stay. National Socialist Party of America
v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977). Six days later,
the Illinois Supreme Court ordered the appellate court to
commence review immediately or to grant a stay of the
injunction. On July 12, 1977, the appellate court reversed
those portions of the injunction which prohibited the
uniformed march and distribution of Nazi literature in
Skokie; however, that court retained the portion of the
injunction which prohibited intentional display of the
However, the court left open the possibility of
subsequent criminal punishment for incitement to
riot, or for any other unlawful conduct on the part
of the demonstrators or the audience.
5
The per curiam opinion stated that the swastika
is symbolic political speech 6 -not "fighting words,"
a narrow form of insulting expression which tends
to provoke immediate, retaliatory breach of the
peace.7 Traditionally, the first amendment has not
shielded fighting words from post factum criminal
punishment. The Illinois Supreme Court indicated
that even if the swastika could have been charac-
terized as "fighting words," a prior restraint on
speech would not have been justified.
Nor would evidence of possible violence on the
part of a hostile crowd have overcome the strong
presumption against a prior restraint. The justices
noted that "courts have consistently refused to ban
speech because of the possibility of unlawful con-
duct by those opposed to the speaker's philoso-
phy."s The court considered the hostile audience
argument particularly unpersuasive because the
Nazi group had given advance notice of their
planned demonstration. "A speaker who gives prior
notice of his message has not compelled a confron-
tation with those who voluntarily listen," the court
reasoned. 9
The asserted purpose of the Nazi demonstration
planned for May 1, 1977, was to protest a $350,000
bond requirement for use of Skokie parks.'0 The
swastika in Skokie. 51 Ill. App. 3d at 295, 366 N.E.2d at.
359.
5 "[I]f the speaker incites others to immediate unlawful
action he may be punished-in a proper case, stopped
when disorder actually impends; but this is not to be
confused with unlawful action from others who seek
unlawfully to suppress or punish the speaker." 69 Ill. 2d
at 617, 373 N.E.2d at 25 (quoting Rockwell v. Morris, 12
App. Div. 2d 272, 281-82, 211 N.Y.S.2d 25, 35-36, aff'd
mer., 10 N.Y.2d 721, 176 N.E.2d 836, 219 N.Y.S.2d 268,
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 913 (1961)).
6 69 Ill. 2d at 618, 373 N.E.2d at 25.7 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568
(1942).
869 Ill. 2d at 616-17, 373 N.E.2d at 251.
9 Id. at 618, 373 N.E.2d at 26.
'oId. at 610, 373 N.E.2d at 22.
The ordinance was held unconstitutional by the
United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois approxinately one month after the Illinois Su-
preme Court decision invalidated the injunction against
PROTECTION OF THE SWASTIKA
proposed march was to consist of thirty to fifty
demonstrators walking single file along the side-
walk, wearing stormtrooper uniforms and swastikas
and carrying signs with slogans such as "Free
Speech For The White Man.""
The village had argued that special circum-
staneces justified an injunction prohibiting display
of the swastika in Skokie. In its brief to the Illinois
Supreme Court, the village cited the "historical
reality of genocide within recent memory" and the
high concentration in Skokie of Jews and Jewish
Holocaust survivors.12 Of approximately 70,000
Skokie residents, 40,500 were Jewish or of Jewish
ancestry, and approximately 5,000-7,000 had sur-
vived Hitler's concentration camps.'5 Opinion ev-
idence showed that a demonstration would result
in violence. 4 The mayor of Skokie testified that
there was a "terrible feeling of unrest" over the
planned demonstration.' 5 One Holocaust survivor
testified that to him, the swastika symbolized the
murdering of his family at the hands of the Nazis.
The survivor added that he did not know if he
the swastika. In Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676 (N.D.
I1. 1978), the court held that the first amendment was
violated by Skokie's ordinance requiring denial of a
permit to prospective assemblages of more than 50 per-
sons where $350,000 insurance bonding was not obtained.
The court found that Skokie had not proved the necessity
of the burdensome effect of the insurance, and that no
principled standards were available for determining
which organization would fall within the ordinance's
exemptions.
The district court further found first amendment vi-
olations in two additional Skokie ordinances-both of
which were criminal measures, and were also enforced
through permit denial in accordance with the first ordi-
nance. One prohibited "dissemination" (defined so as to
include display) of material which intentionally incites
racial or religious hatred. The court found that the
"intentional incitement of hatred" standard was subjec-
tive and therefore unconstitutionally vague. It further
found the ordinance to be overly broad, because it might
have punished intemperate and emotional debate that
could accompany any discussion of race and religion. Id.
at 693. The court indicated that the statute might have
passed constitutional muster if it had been sufficiently
precise to focus only on those fighting words-personally
abusive insults, as opposed to "ideas"-used in an abusive
manner which present an actual danger of causing a
breach of the peace. Id. at 690.
The third ordinance prohibited public demonstrations
by members of political parties while wearing military-
style uniforms. That was held an unconstitutional re-
straint on symbolic political speech.
u 69 Ill. 2d at 610, 373 N.E.2d at 22.
"Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 3.
1369 Ill. 2d at 610, 373 N.E.2d at 22.
14 Id. at 611,373 N.E.2d at 22.
'5 51 Ill. App. 3d at 290, 366 N.E.2d at 355.
could control himself if he were to see the swastika
displayed in the village where he lives.'6 In this
context, the village cited the much-quoted dictum
of Mr. Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United States:
We admit that in many places and in ordinary
times the Defendants ... would have been within
their constitutional rights. But the character of every act
depends upon the circumstances in which it is done'....
The most stringent protection of free speech would
not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a
crowded theatre and causing panic. It does not even
protect a man from an injunction against uttering words that
may have all the effect of force .... The question in
every case is whether the words used are used in
such circumstances as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive
evil that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a
question of proximity and degree.'
7
The Illinois Supreme Court acknowledged that
the sight of the swastika "is abhorrent to the Jewish
citizens of Skokie, and that the survivors of the
Nazi persecutions, tormented by their recollections,
may have strong feelings regarding its display."'
8
However, the court considered it "entirely clear"
that these circumstances did not justify a prior
restraint on the Nazis' speech.' 9
The village had further argued that the display
of the swastika in Skokie would amount to fighting
words-" 'more than speech', 'more than petition',
[sic] just as genocide is more than murder. The
assault upon Jews by evoking the bitter memory of
mother, father, children, brothers and sisters
slaughtered under the swastike [sic] exceeds in
degree anything quoted heretofore as 'fighting
words.' 20
The Illinois Supreme Court, however, refused to
extend the fighting words doctrine to permit an
injunction against the display of a political symbol,
anywhere in the community of Skokie, to a group
of forewarned viewers. By contrast, the fighting
words doctrine arose in the context of subsequent
punishment of verbal insults, spontaneously ut-
tered to an unprepared individual listener in a
direct, face-to-face confrontation.
16 Id.
'" Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 7 (emphasis in brief).
(Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919), where
the United States Supreme Court upheld a post factum
conviction for wartime draft obstruction in connection
with defendant's distribution of anti-draft materials.)
' 69 Ill. 2d at 615, 373 N.E.2d at 24.
19 Id..
20 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 10.
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RECENT TRENDS
In the landmark case of Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
shire,2' the United States Supreme Court upheld a
conviction for defendant's calling an arresting po-
lice officer a "God damned racketeer" and a
"damned Fascist." The conviction was based upon
a statute prohibiting fighting words-those words
with "a direct tendency to cause acts of violence
by the persons to whom, individually, the remark
is addressed."22 According to the Court, the very
utterance of fighting words tends to inflict injury
or incite an- immediate breach of the peace.23 Al-
though dictum in Chaplinsky indicated that "preven-
tion and punishment" of fighting words has never
been thought to raise any constitutional problem,2
the Supreme Court has never had the occasion to
determine the validity of a prior restraint of fight-
ing words. Indeed, so long as courts hold the fight-
ing words doctrine to its context of spontaneity,
the prior restraint issue is not likely to arise.
Although Chaplinsky has never been overruled,
the Supreme Court has never again invoked the
fighting words doctrine to restrict speech. Rather,
the Court has limited the doctrine in two signifi-
cant ways. First, it has indicated that a line is to be
drawn between unprotected fighting words and
the protected communication of unpopular ideas,
since "under our Constitution the public expression
of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the
ideas are themselves offensive to some of their
hearers." 25 Further, the Court has indicated that a
second line is to be drawn between unlawfully
inciting a breach of the peace and lawfully speak-
ing to listeners who react unlawfully.26 Although
21 315 U.S. 568, 569 (1942).
2 Id. at 573. The Court further descrit,,:z. the lighting
words "test" in objective terms: "What men of common
intelligence would understand would be words likely to
cause an average addressee to fight." Id. (emphasis added).
The statute, as allowed by the New Hampshire Supreme
Court, did "no more than prohibit face-to-face words
plainly likely to cause a breach of the peace by the
addressee, words whose speaking constitutes a breach of
the peace." Id. (emphasis added).23 Id. at 572.
24 id.
25 69 Ill. 2d at 612,373 N.E.2d at 23 (quoting Bachellar
v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564,567 (1970), and Street v. New
York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969)).
26 See note 5 supra. See also Collin v. Smith, 447 F.
Supp. 676 (N.D. I11. 1978), discussed in note 10 supra.
There the district court articulated a two part test for
restraining fighting words. First, the speech must be
objectively abusive and insulting-and not a communi-
cation of ideas. Second, it must present an actual danger
of causing a breach of the peace. Id. at -. However, the
court also noted that generally, when an audience be-
comes disorderly and attempts to silence a speaker, "it is
there are no clear standards to help determine on
which side of the abstract lines a given case will
fall, it is evident that the Court will tend to place
its decisions on the side of free speech.
The United States Supreme Court has repeat-
edly held certain offensive expressions to be pro-
tected by the first amendment. For instance, Ter-
miniello v. Chicago27 held it unconstitutional to con-
vict a speaker solely because "his speech stirred
people to anger, invited public dispute, or brought
about a condition of unrest." That finding, accord-
ing to the Court, made it unnecessary to determine
whether the defendant's anti-Semitic and pro-Fas-
cist remarks, made in the vicinity of an angry and
turbulent crowd, constituted fighting words. Sim-
ilarly, in Bachellar v. Maryland,2s the Court over-
turned a conviction because it could have been
based solely on "the doing or saying ... of that
which offends, disturbs, incites or tends to incite a
number of people gathered in the same area." In
that case, the Court declined to characterize as
fighting words the slogans on placards which Viet
Nam war protesters carried in front of a U.S. Army
recruiting station: "Peasant Emancipation, Not
Escalation" and "Make Love, Not War." In Coates
v. Cincinnati,2 the Court held unconstitutional an
ordinance prohibiting groups of three or more
persons from conducting themselves "in a manner
annoying to persons passing by." And in Cohen v.
California,3 the Court held that the first amend-
ment protected the offensive slogan, "Fuck the
Draft," which had been written on the back of the
jacket worn by the defendant in the Los Angeles
courthouse.
The Cohen opinion shed some light on the fight-
ing words doctrine by rejecting its application to
the words on Cohen'- jacket. The Court notect that
the message was not personally directed at anyone,
that no one actually or likely to be present could
reasonably have considered the words a direct
personal insult, and that the state was not attempt-
ing to exercise police power in attempting to pre-
vent intentional provocation of a group to hostile
the duty of the police to attempt to protect the speaker,
not to silence his speech if it does not consist of unpro-
tected epithets." The court further noted that "all the
modem authority rejects the theory that even unpro-
tected speech may be prohibited solely on the basis of its
inherent tendency to cause violence." Id. at -.
27 337 U.S. 1, 5 (1949).
2 397 U.S. 564, 570 (1970).
9 4 0 2 U.S. 611 (1971).
"403 U.S. 15 (1971).
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reaction." The opinion thus concluded that, in the
context at bar, the jacket's message did not consti-
tute fighting words-"those personally abusive ep-
ithets which, when addressed to an ordinary citizen
as a matter of common knowledge, are inherently
likely to provoke violent reaction. ' 32
Similarly, in Village of Skokie, the Illinois Supreme
Court chose to characterize the swastika as offen-
sive speech rather than as fighting words.ss The
court's rationale was apparently expressed in its
lengthy quotation from the Cohen opinion:
The constitutional right of free expression is pow-
erful medicine in a society as diverse and populous
as ours. It is designed and intended to remove
governmental restraints from the arena of public
discussion, putting the decision as to what views
shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us,
in the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately
produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect
polity and in the belief that no other approach
would comport with the premise of individual dig-
nity and choice upon which our political system
rests....
That the air may at times seem filled with verbal
cacophony is, in this sense, not a sign of weakness
but of strength. We cannot lose sight of the fact
that, in what otherwise might seem a trifling and
annoying instance of individual distasteful abuse of
a privilege, these fundamental societal values are
truly implicated.*** '[S]o long as the means are
peaceful, the communication need not meet the
standards of acceptability.'. . .:'
In upholding the Nazis' right to display the
swastika in Skokie, the Illinois court refused to
allow a potentially hostile audience to exercise
advance censorship over what may be expressed in
its presence. That finding is squarely consistent
with decisions of other courts which have tended
to find that, in the face of possible lawlessness on
the part of hearers or viewers, a speaker ordinarily
should be protected rather than prevented from
communicating his ideas.ss
31 Id. at 20.
32 id.
3 The Illinois Supreme Court explained:
The display of the swastika, as offensive to the
principles of a free nation as the memories it recalls
may be, is symbolic political speech intended to
convey to the public the beliefs of those who display
it. It does not, in our opinion, fall within the defi-
nition of "fighting words."
69 Ill. 2d at 615, 373 N.E.2d at 24.
34 Id. at 613-14, 373 N.E.2d at 23-24 (citations omit-
ted) (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24-26
(1971)).
" See Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969);
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 546-48 (1965).
For example, in Kunz v. New York,a6 the United
States Supreme Court held it unconstitutional to
impose a prior restraint upon the speech of one
who had in the past caused some disorder by
ridiculing certain religious beliefs, calling the Pope
"the anti-Christ" and indicating approval of Hit-
ler's incinerators.37 The Court noted that there are
"appropriate public remedies to protect peace and
order of the community if appellant's speeches
should result in disorder or violence."
'8
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held it
impermissible even to consider the threat of a
hostile audience when ruling on a permit applica-
tion or injunctive order. In Collin v. Chicago Park
District,a9 a case involving some of the same indi-
viduals as in the Skokie case, the court said that the
city's refusal to permit Nazis to rally in a Chicago
park amounted to an unconstitutional prior re-
straint of their speech. The court emphasized that
"it has become patent that a hostile audience is not
a basis for restraining otherwise legal First Amend-
ment activity., 40 If the actual lawless behavior of
a crowd is not sufficient to convict a speaket, the
court explained, "then certainly the anticipation of
such events cannot sustain the burden necessary to
justify a prior restraint. '41
Similarly, the possibility of hostile spectators did
not justify denial of a speaking permit to former
Nazi leader George Lincoln Rockwell, even though
Rockwell sought to speak at the congested Union
Square Park in New York City, where approxi-
mately 2.5 million Jews resided. In Rockwell v.
Morris,42 a New York appellate court left open the
possibility of stopping the speaker, or convicting
him, if he were to incite a riot. However, the court
emphasized that there is a distinction between a
speaker's inciting a riot and "unlawful action from
others who seek unlawfully to suppress or punish
the speaker."43 Further, Rockwell dictum indicated
that a prior restraint might bejustifiable in unusual
circumstances where "it is demonstrable on a rec-
3r 340 U.S. 290 (195 1).37 Id. at 296 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
- Id. at 294.
3 460 F.2d 746 (7th Cir. 1972).
4 Id. at 754.
41 id.
42 12 App. Div. 2d 272, 211 N.Y.S.2d 25, a f'dmem, 10
N.Y.2d 721, 176 N.E.2d 836, 219 N.Y.S.2d 268, cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 913 (1961).
43 Id. at 281, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 35. However, the Rockwell
court did not explicitly explain how a court might draw
the distinction between a speaker inciting a riot and




ord that such expression will immediately and
irreparably create injury to the public weal."
The United States District Court for the North-
ern District of Illinois recently stated that the
enjoyment of constitutional rights by the peaceable
and law-abiding must not "depend on the dictates
of those willing to resort to violence."4s Thus, the
court held it unconstitutional for Chicago officials
to deny a permit for a peaceful civil rights march
through a Caucasian neighborhood-a neighbor-
hood that had previously reacted to a similar dem-
onstration with rocks, bricks, pieces of concrete and
explosive devices.
Although the United States Supreme Court did
uphold a post factum conviction of a speaker, it
arguably did so on the ground that certain inflam-
matory racial statements had gone beyond "the
bounds of argument or persuasion" and amounted
to incitement to riot. However, in Feiner v. New
York, 6 other factors might have substantially con-
tributed to justification of the conviction. Appar-
ently, public safety was endangered because pedes-
trians were forced to walk in the street while traffic
was passing, as a result of the crowd's blocking of
the sidewalk and spilling over onto the street.
Further, the defendant had refused to obey three
police orders to stop speaking to the crowd.
Recently a federal district court sustained an
injunction against a Nazi march planned to take
place around Jewish synagogues during the High
Holy Days. The result in Jewish War Veterans of the
United States v. American Nazi Party4v 7 was partially
based upon a finding "that a present danger did
Id at 277-78, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 32. The court did not
give specific examples of the requisite "immediate and
irreparable injury." But see Jewish War Veterans of the
United States v. American Nazi Party, notes 40-41 supra
and accompanying text.
45 Dr. Martin Luther King,Jr., Movement, Inc. v. City
of Chicago, 419 F. Supp. 667, 677 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
46 340 U.S. 315, 321 (1951).
47 260 F. Supp. 452, 455 (1966).
exist that riots would be incited ... " However,
the court also stated that its decision was necessary
to protect the constitutional rights of Jewish wor-
shippers to practice their religion in safety.
48
In sum, reversal of the injunction against dis-
playing the swastika in Skokie clearly comports
with established principles of free speech. Prior
restraints are presumed to be invalid and courts
tend to protect offensive speech by declining to
characterize it as fighting words. To whatever ex-
tent the fighting words doctrine is grounded on the
potential violence of the person insulted, that doc-
trine directly conflicts with the principle that
speakers ought not be punished for the lawless
actions of listeners. And generally, speech is not to
be stifled merely because it represents the views of
an unpopular minority-however likely it is that
an angry majority may react unlawfully. As the
Rockwell court concluded:
[T]he unpopularity of views, their shocking quality,
their obnoxiousness, and even their alarming impact
is not enough. Otherwise, the preacher of any
strange doctrine could be stopped; the anti-racist
himself could be suppressed, if he undertakes to
speak in "restricted" areas; and one who asks that
public schools be open indiscriminately to all, ethnic
groups could be lawfully suppressed, if only he
choose to speak where persuasion is needed most.
Surely, there is risk in denying prior restraint. It is
a price paid for liberty while order is to be preserved
by the sanction of punishment after the fact. It is
the price paid for not having the policeman or the
Commissioner as censor, while leaving the courts,
disciplined by appellate review and the rules of
evidence, to provide punishment under criminal
standards for the unlawful act already committed.
But the risk is not so great as to be intolerable in
a civilized, law-abiding community.
49
48Id. at 456.
49 Rockwell v. Morris, 12 App. Div. 2d at 282,283,211
N.Y.S.2d at 35-36, 37.
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WARRANTLESS SEARCHES OF PAROLEES
In November 1977, the highest courts of two
states' considered the extent to which a parolee
had rights under the fourth amendment to the
Constitution.2 Specifically the two courts addressed
the issue of whether a warrantless parolee search
which produces evidence for a new criminal pros-
ecution meets constitutional standards. In the ab-
sence of a Supreme Court holding on this question,
state and federal rulings have varied broadly. Al-
though neither of the decisions discussed here ex-
tends this spectrum, they do illuminate further
possible approaches and rationales open to a court
considering parolee searches. In Roman v. State,3 the
Supreme Court of Alaska held that a warrantless
search of a parolee is constitutional when the pa-
rolee has signed a condition agreeing to such a
search, if the condition is reasonable and if the
searching parole officer has reasonable grounds to
believe that a parole violation is taking place.' The
holding by the New York Court of Appeals in
People v. Huntley5 was broader: a parole officer's
warrantless search of a parolee's residence does not
offend the Constitution so long as the officer's
conduct is "rationally and reasonably related to
the performance of his duty as a parole officer."
6
I Other states whose highest courts have ruled on the
fourth amendment rights of parolees include: Arizona,
State v. Montgomery, 566 P.2d 1329 (Ariz. 1977); Cali-
fornia, People v. Mason, 5 Cal. 3d 759, 488 P.2d 630, 97
Cal. Rptr. 302 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1016 (1972);
Colorado, People v. Anderson, 536 P.2d 302 (Colo. 1975);
Iowa, State v. Cullison, 173 N.W.2d 533 (Iowa), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 938 (1970); Missouri, State v. Williams,
486 S.W.2d 468 (Mo. 1972); Nevada, Himmage v. State,
88 Nev. 296, 496 P.2d 763 (1972); Wisconsin, State v.
Tarrell, 74 Wis. 2d 647, 247 N.W.2d 696 (1976). One
federal court of appeals has also ruled on the issue in
Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 897 (1975).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no
Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
3 570 P.2d 1235 (Alaska 1977).
4 Id. at 1238.
5 43 N.Y.2d 175, 371 N.E.2d 794, 401 N.Y.S.2d 31
(1977).
6401 N.Y.S.2d at 33, 371 N.E.2d at 796.
BACKGROUND
When the United States Supreme Court in Mor-
rissey v. Brewer held that parolees have some mea-
sure of federal constitutional rights, the majority of
courts had to reconsider their analyses of parolee
rights. Pre-Morrisey courts had, under several re-
lated theories including the theory of "constructive
custody," withheld constitutional rights from pa-
rolees, reasoning that because a parolee was free
only at the beneficence of the state, his rights were
diminished.8 The custodial approach was fore-
closed by Morrissey's recognition that although pa-
rolees do not possess the "full panoply of rights"9
and although their liberty is merely
"conditional,"'0 they are entitled to the constitu-
tional protections of due process.
Since Morrissey, courts have had to proceed on
the assumption that parolees have at least some
fourth amendment rights. Because the freedom
guaranteed under the amendment is protection
from unreasonable search and seizure,1' courts have
had to decide which searches are reasonable when
directed against a parolee and which searches he
may justifiably protest. In answering this question,
the courts initially had to consider whether a pa-
7408 U.S. 471 (1972). In Morrissey, the Court held that
because parolees retain some measure of fourteenth
amendment due process rights, they are entitled to a
hearing process before revocation of parole. The Court
based its holding on the rationale developed in Goldberg
v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), that when a "grievous
loss" may be inflicted upon a citizen he is entitled to
certain minimal procedural safeguards.
8 See, e.g., Rose v. Haskins, 388 F.2d 91 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 392 U.S. 946 (1968); United States ex re. Randazzo
v. Follette, 282 F. Supp. 10 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), affid, 418
F.2d 1319 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 984 (1971);
People v. Hernandez, 229 Cal. App. 2d 143, 40 Cal.
Rptr. 100 (1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 953 (1965). In
Randazzo and Hernandez, the courts drew a distinction
between the rights of parolees and those of probationers.
Because the former had been in prison, they, like other
prisoners, had lost their constitutional rights; the latter,
never incarcerated, were not so stripped. Neither court,
however, viewed a parolee as totally devoid of rights after
he had left prison.
For a discussion of other pre-Morrissey theories concern-
ing parolees' constitutional rights, see 68 J. CRIM. L. &
C. 412, 421 (1977).
9 408 U.S. at 480.
1
°Id. at 482.
" Note 2 supra.
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rolee has the same fourth amendment rights when
the evidence of the search is used in a parole
revocation'hearing as he has when it is used in a
criminal prosecution for a new crime. Universally,
the courts have decided that the parolee does not
have the same rights.'2
For example, in United States v. Winsett,'5 the
court held that the fourth amendment's exclusion-
ary rule, which prohibits the incriminating use of
evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search,
is not applicable in a probation 4 revocation hear-
ing. The court pointed out that the rule is designed
not to protect individuals but rather to deter law
enforcement personnel from proceeding unconsti-
tutionally."5 Only if the police knew the offender
was on probation (or parole' could they be de-
terred by application of the exclusionary rule to
revocation proceedings. Additionally, the court
reasoned that extending the rule to such proceed-
ings would undermine the function of probation or
12 United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51 (9th Cir.
1975); United States v. Farmer, 512 F.2d 160 (6th Cir.),
erL denied, 423 U.S. 987 (1975); United States v. Brown,
488 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Hill, 447
F.2d 817 (7th Cir. 1971); United States ex rel. Sperling v.
Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 1970); United States
v. Allen, 349 F. Supp. 749 (N.D. Cal. 1972); State v.
Sears, 553 P.2d 907 (Alaska 1976); Croteau v. State, 334
So. 2d 577 (Fla. 1976); People v. Dowery, 62 Ill. 2d 200,
340 N.E.2d 529 (1975); Stone v. Shea, 113 N.H. 174, 304
A.2d 647 (1973); Commonwealth v. Kates, 452 Pa. 102,
305 A.2d 701 (1973); Reeves v. Turner, 28 Utah 2d 310,
501 P.2d 1212 (1972); State v. Kuhn, 7 Wash. App. 190,
499 P.2d 49 (1972); In re Martinez, I Cal. 3d 641, 463
P.2d 734, 83 Cal. Rptr. 382, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 851
(1970). -
13518 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1975). In Winsett, the defend-
ant, a probationer, had been arrested by the border
patrol near the California-Mexico line; he was transporting
100 pounds of marijuana. The search was invalidated as
a border search, and defendant's motion to suppress the
evidence was granted when a criminal prosecution was
brought on the basis of the seized marijuana. The fruits
of the illegal search were held admissible in the probation
revocation hearing, however, and testimony of the border
patrol agent allowed.
14 The Supreme Court has extended the Morrissey rule
to probationers in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778
(1973), treating parole and probation as similar condi-
tions. Therefore the rationales which support a court's
ruling in one area are often used interchangeably in the
9ther. See, e.g., Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975), dealing with parole, and
its companion case, United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez,
521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975), dealing with probation.
1" The Winsett court was relying here on the Supreme
Court's reasoning in United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338, 347 (1974).
16 See note 14 supra.
parole-to rehabilitate the offender as well as to
protect the public from further offenses-by keep-
ing from the revocation hearing officers informa-
tion vital to an informed decision-making process.
The issue still open concerns what searches are
reasonable when they produce evidence for a new
criminal prosecution against a parolee.' 7 The the-
ories that courts have used in making this deter-
mination are basically three:' 8 (1) consent or
waiver, (2) reasonable expectations of privacy, and
(3) administrative search.
Since traditionally a warrant is not required
under the fourth amendment when the search is
consented to,' 9 several courts have avoided the
amendment's reasonableness requirement alto-
gether where a condition to parole was a promise
by the parolee to submit to a warrantless search at
any reasonable time, by any law enforcement offi-
cer.2 The condition was viewed as a consent to
waive fourth amendment rights.2 ' Other courts
7 See note 14 supra.
8 United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259,
268 (9th Cir. 1975) (Wright, J., dissenting). In general,
the nature or degree of the search at issue, i.e., whether it
is a search of the person, residence or property of the
parolee, has not been a factor in a court's selection of a
theory for analysis.
" Other exceptions to the fourth amendment's warrant
requirement are (1)border search exception, (2) automo-
bile exception, (3) search incident to arrest exception, (4)
hot pursuit exception, (5) plain-view doctrine, (6) emer-
gency doctrine, and (7) doctrine of exigent circumstances.
The last is an umbrella exception which may cover other
specific exceptions but may also be broader in certain
situations. See United States v. Mapp, 476 F.2d 67, 76
(2d Cir. 1973), for a partial list. See generally 68 J. CRIM.
L. & C. 412, 420-26 (1977).
20 In People v. Mason, 5 Cal. 3d 759, 488 P.2d 630, 97
Cal. Rptr. 302 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1016 (1972),
the court held reasonable a probation condition which
permitted a day- or night-time warrantless search by
either the probation officer or other law enforcement
personnel. The court did require that the condition be
related (1) to the crime of the probationer, and (2) to
criminal conduct or conduct reasonably related to future
criminality. Since the probationer's offense in Mason was
narcotics possession, the condition passed muster.
A North Carolina court was less restrictive in its view
that a condition allowing warrantless search by law
enforcement officers at reasonable hours could function
as consent. State v. Mitchell, 22 N.C. App. 663, 207
S.E.2d 263 (1974). The court held, however, that where
the police had broken down the door of the probationers'
residence without giving notice and demanding entry
first, the fruits of the search could not be used, and
suppression of evidence so obtained was required.
' As the court in People v. Mason, 5 Cal. 3d 759, 483
P.2d 630, 97 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
1016 (1972), pointed out, the Supreme Court has held
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have refused to allow evidence from searches con-
ducted under the "authority" of conditions they
have deemed overbroad22 or have upheld searches
under an overbroad condition only when the search
at issue was conducted within narrower param-
eters.23 These courts have insisted that the condi-
tion be reasonably related to the objectives of
probation or parole and thus have moved away
from the consent theory and back to measuring the
reasonableness of the search under the fourth
amendment's standards. A final group of courts
have rejected the fiction of consent entirely, point-
ing out that a choice between submitting to the
parole condition and remaining in jail is no choice
at all.24
The second theory utilized to analyze parolee
searches, reasonable expectations of privacy, was
explained in Latta v. Fitzharris.25 Because parole
officers need to know a great deal about their
charges in order to aid the rehabilitation of the
parolee as well as to protect the public and because
interviews alone cannot give the parole officer all
the information he needs, it is necessary that a
parolee and his home be subject to search when
the "officer reasonably believes that such a search
is necessary.", 26 Thus, a parolee must expect his
privacy rights to be reduced by his parole status.
The Latta court also relied on the administrative
search theory,27 noting that the Supreme Court in
United States v. BiswellP and Colonnade Catering Corp.
v. United States29 had reasoned that a search carried
out under authority of a statute in a heavily-regu-
lated area (gun sales and liquor sales, respectively)
that fourth amendment rights may be waived. Zap v.
United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946).
22 See, e.g., Tamez v. State, 534 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. Grim.
App. 1976), and United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521
F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975). In Tamez, a condition calling
for searches anytime by either probation or other law
enforcement officers was found overbroad and unreason-
able in light of the goals of probation to rehabilitate or
reform the offender. Consuelo-Gonzalez dealt with the Fed-
eral Probation Act.
2 In United States v. Gordon, 540 F.2d 452 (9th Cir.
1976), the court determined that the search itself had
been conducted in a proper manner and for a proper
purpose.
4 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Coleman v. Smith, 395
F. Supp. 1155 (W.D.N.Y. 1975).
25 521 F.2d 246 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
897 (1976). See also State v. Williams, 486 S.W.2d 468
(Mo. 1972).
26 521 F.2d at 250.
27Id. at 251.
28 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
29 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
could also be justified under the diminished rea-
sonable expectations of privacy rationale. 
°
No matter what theory the courts have used to
analyze parolee searches, there are, in addition,
recurring questions which must be considered.
These questions deal with the nature and objectives
of the parole (or probation) system itself. The
objectives of parole or probation are dual and
occasionally at odds:31 to aid in the rehabilitation
of the offender and to protect the public from future
criminal acts.3 The question of who may search a
parolee without a warrant has been resolved fairly
uniformly, at least where the parolee is not deemed
to have consented to a search by one other than
his parole officer.33 Courts agree that while a war-
rantless search by the parole officer may be related
to the dual functions of parole, a similar search by
police in general is not so related; the latter need
the usual fourth amendment requirement of prob-
able cause to make a search.' It follows then that
"' For an argument against the administrative search
theory, see United States ex rel. Coleman v. Smith, 395 F.
Supp. 1155, 1160 (W.D.N.Y. 1975).
On Feb. 1, 1978, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-3-7,
dealing with parole conditions, and § 1003-14-2, dealing
with the authority of parole agents, went into effect. Such
a statutory scheme might better justify the use of the
administrative search doctine.
" judge Wright in his dissent to United States v.
Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 270 (9th Cir. 1975),
points out that the probation officer's manual suggests
that he de-emphasize his law enforcement role by not
being the officer to make the arrest of his probationer.
The author of Note, Fourth Amendment Limitations on Pro-
bation and Parole Supervision, 1976 DUKE L.J. 71, 78, notes
that time constraints and heavy case loads all too often
lead a parole or probation officer to function as a police-
man rather than as a counselor.
32 United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259
(9th Cir. 1975).
3 See note 20 supra.
i The Supreme Court defined probable cause in Beck
v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964):
Whether that arrest was constitutionally valid de-
pends ... upon whether, at the moment the arrest
was made, the officers had probable cause to make
it-whether at that moment the facts and circum-
stances within their knowledge and of which they
had reasonably trustworthy information were suffi-
cient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the
... [arresteel had commited or was committing an
offense.
Id. at 91.
5 See, e.g., Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975); United States ex rel.
Coleman v. Smith, 395 F. Supp. 1155 (W.D.N.Y. 1975);
People v. Anderson, 536 P.2d 302 (Colo. 1975); State v.
Simms, 10 Wash. App. 75, 516 P.2d 1088 (1973): People
v. Hernandez, 229 Cal. App. 2d 143, 40 Cal. Rptr. 100
(1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 953 (1965). For an argument
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when a parole officer is seen to have lost sight of
his rehabilitative function and to have become
merely another law enforcement officer, the general
rule allowing parole officer searches must be qual-
ified. Such was the reasoning of the court in United
States v. Hallman,s6 where the parole officer was seen
to be the "tool, agent, or device"37 of the police,
who used him to make a search they could not. But
this distinction is not clearly defined, for in later
cases searches in cooperation with police officials?8
or even instigated by the polices 9 have been up-
held. 40
Another question courts have dealt with con-
cerns the purpose of the parole officer's search. Did
the search take place as a result of a suspicion of a
parole violation held by the officer or was it merely
a routine search? In general, courts have held that
a routine search may not be made without a prior
purpose in mind,4' although the evidence seized
need not always be related to the suspected parole
violation.42 Certainly a search may not be made
that it is unrealistic to allow only parole or probation
officers to search for parole or probation violations where
the officer may be located miles from, say, a small-town
offender, see United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521
F.2d 259, 271 (9th Cir. 1975) (Wright, J., dissenting).
'6 365 F.2d 289 (3d Cir. 1966). See also Commonwealth
v. Brown, 240 Pa. Super. Ct. 190, 361 A.2d 846 (1976).
37 365 F.2d at 292.
3 United States v. Gordon, 540 F.2d 452 (9th Cir.
1976); Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975); People v. Anderson, 536 P.2d
302 (Colo. 1975); State v. Culbertson, 29 Or. App. 363,
563 P.2d 1224 (1977).
39 United States ex rel. Santos v. N.Y. State Bd. of
Parole, 441 F.2d 1216 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1025 (1972); Peopl v. Fortunato, 50 App. Div. 2d 38,
376 N.Y.S.2d 723 (1975); People v. Hernandez, 229 Cal.
App. 2d 143, 40 Cal. Rptr. 100 (1964), cert. denied, 381
U.S. 953 (1965).
4 For the history of complications concerning the pa-
role officer search rule in California, see Note, Fourth
Amendment Limitations in Probation and Parole, 1976 DuKE
L.J. 71, 82-84.
41 The court in United States ex rel. Coleman v. Smith,
395 F. Supp. 1155, 1158 (W.D.N.Y. 1975), found offen-
sive a "routine," "unfettered" search by a parole officer
who thought it was his duty to conduct such searches
from time to time. See also Commonwealth v. Brown, 240
Pa. Super. Ct. 190, 361 A.2d 846 (1976). ProfessorJames
Haddad of Northwestern University School of Law has
pointed out in a memorandum to the author that these
decisions may conflict with the rule that a parole officer
may not act as just another police officer. If a prior
purpose is necessary to validate the search, that may
increase the chances that the parole authority is being
used as a guise to search for criminal evidence. The rule
is also at odds with parole conditions which require
periodic blood or urine tests.
42 People v. Anderson, 536 P.2d 302 (Colo. 1975).
for the sole purpose of harassment,43 but precisely
what sort of suspicion may justify the parole offi-
cer's search is an open question. Courts have run
the gamut, from allowing a mere hunch," through
well-founded suspicion45 and reasonable belief16 all
the way to probable cause.47 The two extremes
noted here are represented by Latta v. Fitzharris,48
where the court held that a parole officer's hunch
could form the basis of his reasonable belief that a
search was necessary, and State v. Cullison,49 where
the Iowa Supreme Court determined that parolees'
rights are no different from those of other citizens,
and therefore the usual probable cause standard
had to be met in order to validate a parolee search.
Even with a stricter standard, it is necessary to
keep in mind that the status of a parolee or pro-
bationer may greatly affect what conduct is "rea-
sonable" in relation to him.5
It is against this background of sometimes con-
flicting theories, differing emphases and occasional
murky semantic distinctions (e.g., "reasonable be-
lief," "well-founded suspicion," "hunch") that the
highest courts of Alaska and New York made their
decisions concerning parolee searches. The two
43 Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975); United States ex rel. Randazzo
v. Follette, 282 F. Supp. 10 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), afj'd, 418
F.2d 1319 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 984 (1971).
"Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975).
4 State v. Simms, 10 Wash. App. 205, 516 P.2d 1088
(1973).
46 Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975); United States ex rel. Coleman
v. Smith, 395 F. Supp. 1155 (W.D.N.Y. 1975); People v.
Anderson, 536 P.2d 302 (Colo. 1975).
47In State v. Cullison, 173 N.W.2d 533 (Iowa), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 938 (1970), the Supreme Court of Iowa
held that a parolee's fourth amendment rights are iden-
tical to those of ordinary citizens; thus the test was the
fourth amendment's probable cause requirement. An
Oregon court also decreed the probable cause standard
for a parolee search conducted in the absence of a circum-
scribed condition. State v. Culbertson, 29 Or. App. 363,
563 P.2d 1224 (1977).
48 521 F.2d 246 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897
(1975).
49 173 N.W.2d 533 (Iowa), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 938
(1970).
50 See, e.g., State v. Tarrell, 74 Wis. 2d 647, 247 N.W.2d
696 (1976), where the court said, "The application of a
less stringent standard for the probation agent's search
or seizure is appropriate because of the nature of proba-
tion." Id. at 655, 247 N.W.2d at 701.
The Latta court stated that a "parolee is in a different
position from that of the ordinary citizen," 521 F.2d at
249, and the court in Randazzo pointed out that what is
normally unreasonable may be changed by the status of
parole. 282 F. Supp. at 12.
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courts' approaches are quite different, although
they share certain basic assumptions. The Alaska
court's opinion is well-researched, with nearly all
the existing case law on the subject cited and all
the current theories discussed. The New York
court's opinion is less structured, and, on the sur-
face, there is less reliance on the reasoning of other
courts. The reasoning of both courts does, however,
start with the nearly universally accepted proposi-
tions that the constructive custody doctrine of'par-
olee rights is no longer viable and that only a
parole officer may be justified in making a war-
rantless search based on less than probable cause.
CASES
In Roman v. State,5' heroin was found on the
person of the parolee after a search by his parole
officer.5 2 This search occurred at an airport after
the parole officer had received a tip that Roman
had recently used heroin.53 The parole officer did
not conduct the search until after Roman had told
him that he was unable to give a urine sample,5 as
he had consented to do under the original parole
conditions. A supplemental condition, signed by
Roman just before the search, permitted the search
of his person. The court held that the facts of
Roman's imminent departure and his inability to
produce the urine specimen, in combination with
the information that Roman had recently used
heroin, constituted reasonable grounds for a belief
on the part of the parole officer that a parole
violation was taking place. The trial court's denial
of defendant's motion to suppress the heroin evi-
dence was thus affirmed.
The court reasoned that while a parolee's status
was justification for treating him differently from
other citizens, that justification existed only where
"valid purposes of parole require restrictions. ' ' 5
The court rejected both the pre-Morrissey6 con-
st 570 P.2d 1235 (Alaska 1977).
52 Roman had been paroled following a conviction for
possession of heroin. Id. at 1237.
s3 Roman had appeared earlier at a parole revocation
hearing and, as a result of that proceeding, was required
to sign supplemental parole conditions. After receiving a
tip from a federal narcotics agent that Roman had used
heroin the previous night, the parole officer went to the
airport where Roman was taking off for his job on the
.northern Alaska pipeline, planning to obtain Roman's
signature on the supplemental conditions as well as check
,out the tip. Roman's departure was not itself a parole
violation. Id. at 1237-38.
54 The court noted that the parole officer was not sure
whether Roman had refused to produce the specimen or
had been physically unable to do so. Id. at 1238.
5 Id. at 1240.
" 408 U.S. 471 (1972). See note 7 supra.
structive custody rationale regarding parolees'
rights5 7 and the consent-to-conditions theory, 8
which requires -that valid consent must be freely
given in light of all the facts and circumstances
involved. 9 Freely-given consent in the parole situ-
ation was not believed possible by the court. The
court also rejected the administrative-search the-
ory, 60 pointing out that since there was no statutory
regulatory scheme in the parole area, the situations
were not analogous.6'
The court, however, did accept the premise that
a parolee has diminished expectations of privacy,
since conditions to submit to search have been
imposed upon him. Such conditions would be al-
lowed only if they conformed with standards enun-
ciated by the court; the search so stipulated must
be (1) reasonably related to the crime the parolee
had committed,62 and (2) conducted by the parole
officer, since only his "mandate ... to rehabilitate
... and to protect society ... justifies an intrusion
into the privacy of the released offender."' The
court called upon the state parole board to pre-
scribe specific rules governing the time and manner
of permissible searches in order to achieve uniform-
ity among offenders and to prevent abuse.
Finally, the court pointed out in a lengthy foot-
note that its holding-essentially that a reasonable
belief is necessary for a parolee search where a
condition to parole allows search-was not to apply
to a parolee search in which there was no condition
requiring searches. In that situation, the probable
cause standard would be required."
In People v. Huntley,65 the parole officer's search
of a parolee's apartment turned tsp drugs and drug
paraphernalia. The parolee was obligated under a
"standard"' parole condition to submit to the
5- See text accompanying note 8 supra.
u See text accompanying note 20 supra.
59 570 P.2d at 1241 n.17. The court's consent require-
ment was that spelled out by the Supreme Court in
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968), and
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).60See text accompanying note 27 supra.
61 570 P.2d at 1242 n.21.
62 Id. at 1242-43. The court pointed out that a condi-
tion requiring submission to a search of the person would
be inappropriate for one convicted of manslaughter or
reckless driving, but perfectly reasonable for one whose
offense was narcotics dealing or concealing stolen prop-
ert d. at 1242 n.20.
Id. at 1244 n.29.
6543 N.Y.2d 175, 401 N.Y.S.2d 31, 371 N.E.2d 794
(1977).
66 The court characterized the standard condition, ap-
parently imposed on all New York parolees, as one
subjecting the parolee to "'searches of his person, residence
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search. A parole violation warrant had been issued
for Huntley after he had twice failed to make
required weekly reports to his parole officer, and it
was pursuant to this warrant that Huntley had
been arrested in his apartment immediately before
the search. The purpose of the search was to con-
firm the parole officer's suspicion that Huntley
might be concealing a gun in his apartment, given
his conviction for armed robbery.
The trial court had denied defendant's motion
to suppress the seized evidence, and the appellate
court affirmed.6 7 The state's highest court, affirm-
ing also, reasoned that while a parolee did possess
fourth amendment rights, the status of parole "is
relevant and may be critical ' ' ss in evaluating what
governmental intrusion upon those rights is reason-
able under the amendment. The court noted that
if the parole officer is the individual conducting a
search, the assessment of reasonableness is further
qualified. While the standard for a parolee search
by a police officer is that of probable cause, the
court found that the standard for similar conduct
by a parole officer involves a finding of whether
,that conduct was "rationally and reasonably re-
lated to the performance of the parole officer's
duty.' ' 9 The relation must be more than a rational
connection; it must be "substantial." 70 The court
then defined a parole officer's duties as two-
pronged: "[h]e has an obligation to detect and to
prevent parole violations for the protection of the
public from the commission of further crimes;71 he
also has a responsibility to the parolee to prevent
violations of parole and to assist him to a proper
reintegration into his community."'72 The latter
duty differentiates the parole officer from other
law enforcement personnel, but the court added a
caveat that the parole officer did not have "carte
blanche" as a result of his position.
73
Addressing the facts of the case at bar, the court
held that the series of failures to report and the
facts that defendant, though able-bodied, had quit
or property." 371 N.E.2d at 798, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 35.
6753 App. Div. 2d 820, 386 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1976)
(Mem.).
6 371 N.E.2d at 797, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 34.
6 371 N.E.2d at 797, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 34.
7 371 N.E.2d at 797, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 34.
71 It is unlikely that the court here means to intimate
that all parole violations arc criminal. In fact, many
parole violations do not involve illegal acts: a parolee
may be required not to leave a given area without
permission or not to associate with certain people. Indeed,
the parole violations in Huntley were not criminal.
72 371 N.E.2d at 797, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 34.
73371 N.E.2d at 797, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 34.
his job, had lied about his employment status and
had accepted welfare without permission, rendered
the officer's search permissible. Also significant, the
court added, was the fact that the parole officers
were not seeking evidence for a criminal prosecu-
tion. Finally, the court noted that the standard
authorization for searches-the condition to parole
signed by every parolee-could not be considered
a consent to any sort of search or a waiver of
constitutional rights.
A comparison of the Alaska and New York cases
reveals at least one major difference in analysis and
result. While the Alaska court looked at the rela-
tionship between the condition the parolee had
agreed to and the objectives of parole, the New
York court instead concentrated on the relationship
between the nature of parole and the search itself
as conducted by the parole officer. The New York
court touched on the parole condition only as an
afterthought. The Alaska court in Roman sought to
protect the parolee's rights by mandating standards
for parole conditions, while the New York court in
Huntley sought the same result by regulating the
parole officer's conduct. Roman attempts to limit
the areas of human judgment; Huntley relies more
heavily on the discretion of parole personnel. The
Alaska court's insistence that a parole condition
allowing searches be related to the parolee's offense
requires a before-the-fact assessment of how best to
achieve the objectives of parole, while the New
York court's requirement that the search be related,
albeit "substantially," to the parole officer's duties
involves an inevitably after-the-fact finding.
The two courts' opinions do, however, share
similar notions concerning the theory underlying a
parolee's fourth amendment rights. Both courts
rejected the constructive custody and consent the-
ories. Both courts agreed that unconstitutional con-
ditions may not be imposed upon parolees and that
a waiver of or consent to a deprivation of consti-
tutional rights may not be found in a parole con-
dition. While the New York court made no explicit
statement of its theoretical rationale, its remarks
concerning the relevance of a parolee's status to a
determination of the legality of conduct involving
him may imply a view that there is a diminished
right to privacy. Since the Alaska court relied on
the expectations of privacy theory, the courts may
be in more agreement fundamentally than they
appear to be on the surface.
Neither Roman nor Huntley extends the range of
existing law on parolee searches. In fact, the two
cases illustrate the wide variance in courts' ap-
proaches to this question, since they rely on quite
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different sorts of reasoning. The only discernible
"trend" in this area of the law is a movement
toward the middle ground between the Latta v.
Fitzharris4 holding that a parole officer's hunch
may validate a parolee search and the Iowa Su-
preme Court's State v. Cullison75 ruling that only
probable cause may do so. The New York court
essentially adopted the "reasonable parole
officer"76 standard of Latta, and the Alaska court,
considering its dictum that only a reasonably cir-
cumscribed condition to submit to search can re-
duce the usual probable cause standard to reason-
'4 521 F.2d 246 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897
(1975). The court in State v. Culbertson, 29 Or. App.
363, 563 P.2d 1224 (1977), characterized the Latta stan-
dard as just short of harrassment.
7. 173 N.W.2d 533 (Iowa), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 938
(1970).
76 The court in Coleman, 395 F. Supp. 1155, referred to
the Latta standard in these words.
able belief is further along the spectrum toward
the Iowa rule.
The reasonable expectations of privacy rationale
used in Roman would seem to be both consonant
with the Morrissey holding and the most realistic of
the three theories of parolee search commonly used
today. 77 Even within that theory, however, enor-
mous variations in rulings are possible, depending
on how restrictively a court views a parolee's ex-
pectations. Also, how firmly a court holds to the
idea that parole is punishment may affect its judg-
ment proportionately, and this is true whether the
court is attempting to judge a written parole con-
dition or the conduct of a parole officer. Thus, even
agreement among courts upon one theory is not
likely to yield uniform standards for parolee
searches.
77 See text accompanying note 18 supra.
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